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Abstract 
Artefactual field experiments, spatial econometrics, and household survey are blended 
in a single study to investigate how the experience of collective irrigation management 
in the real world facilitates the spillover of social behaviour among neighbours. The 
dictator and public goods games are conducted among irrigated and non-irrigated rice 
farmers in the Philippines. The spillover effect is found only among irrigated farmers. In 
the public goods game, punishment through social disapproval reduces free-riding more 
effectively among irrigated farmers. These indicate that strengthened ties among 
neighbours are likely to induce the spillover of social norms together with an effective 
punishment mechanism.  
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1. Introduction 
A growing number of studies have uncovered the existence of many kinds of social 
behaviour such as altruism, trust, and cooperation and punishment for public purposes, 
although a standard model of Homo economicus does not predict so (Fehr and Gächter, 
2000; Ostrom, 2000; Henrich et al. 2001; Bowles and Gintis, 2011). Moreover, many 
empirical and experimental studies have observed variation in patterns of social 
behaviour across different groups of subjects (Cardenas et al. 2008; Henrich et al. 2010; 
Lamba and Mace, 2011; Gächter et al. 2012). Understanding differences in the 
formation process and in the level of social behaviour is important because recent 
investigations insist that social behaviour considerably affects key economic 
phenomena, including economic growth, poverty reduction, consumption smoothing, 
collective action, and the optimal design of contracts, institutions, and markets.  
 The development of social norms is a key phenomenon that will help in 
understanding the formation of social behaviour better. The role of norms is found in 
their capacity of domesticating our Homo economicus preference and deriving 
pro-social behaviour for sustainable and successful interaction among a large number of 
people, some of whom may be unknown to each other, in a more complicated society 
where new technologies and the environment change the expected returns to 
relation-specific investments (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994; Bowels, 
1998; Henrich et al. 2010). Then, as evolutionary approach emphasises, more effective 
norms spill over among people in a society by a variety of theoretically and empirically 
underpinned mechanisms, including gene-culture coevolution (in the very long-run), 
adoptive cultural reaction varying from the imitation of more successful norms to 
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simple conformism to the current majority and a decision by leaders (Ostrom, 2000; 
Henrich, 2004; Bowels and Gintis, 2011; Lamba and Mace, 2011). Under such possible 
processes, the development of norms in society may be observed as the process 
enhancing the co-variation of social behaviour through a spillover effect.  
 However, the examination of the spillover effect is missing in existing studies 
on the determinants of social behaviour, which have focused mainly on macro factors 
such as market integration, ecology, and culture, as well as on micro factors such as 
group size and socioeconomic heterogeneity (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom et al. 
2000; Henrich et al. 2010; Rustagi et al. 2010; Gächter et al. 2012). Over the past 
decade, with the development of spatial econometric techniques, statistical examination 
of the interdependent behaviour of individuals who share spatial, social, and economic 
milieus has become possible (Anselin and Griffith, 1998; Anselin, 2003; Anselin, 
2010). 
 Taking advantage of the recent development in techniques, our research strategy 
is to blend artefactual field experiments, spatial econometrics, and household survey in 
a single study. Two experiments (dictator game and public goods game) are conducted 
by the authors to quantitatively elicit the general attitude of altruism and cooperation, 
respectively, from farmers in Bohol, the Philippines. In the context of rural agrarian 
communities, day-to-day social interactions take place within the communities. Thus, 
subsequently, the spillover of such social behaviour in the local communities is tested 
using spatial econometric techniques, while socioeconomic and agroecological factors 
collected through the household survey are duly controlled for.  
 Extra attention is paid to the difference in spillover effects between the 
irrigated and non-irrigated (or rainfed) areas. Among many, collective management of 
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common pool resources is regarded as an opportunity that strengthens ties and generates 
social norms among local people (Ostrom, 2000; Aoki, 2001; Hayami and Godo, 2005; 
Fujiie et al. 2005; Hayami, 2009). In our study area, a gravity irrigation system, which 
must be managed collectively by the users in geographical proximity, was newly 
introduced in the traditional rainfed rice area two years before our survey. This event 
would strengthen location-based ties, which can be captured as neighbourhood effects in 
spatial economics. In short, this paper intends to show empirically how the increased 
importance of collective action among local people in the real world facilitates the 
spillover of general social behaviour among spatial neighbours.
1
  
 From the analysis, three main findings emerged. First, altruistic behaviour and 
cooperative behaviour are significantly influenced by those of the neighbours 
predominantly in the irrigated areas, implying the inclination to domesticate personal 
preference and to behave similarly to their neighbours through the experience of 
collective irrigation management. Note, however, that this finding also implies that the 
domestication of personal preference may not necessarily mean that it is pro-social, 
because the neighbourhood effect can also result in reduction of the high contributors’ 
contribution to the neighbours’ level, pointing to the possibility of a vicious consequence 
of a conformism-type of norm dissemination. Second, the neighbourhood effect for 
cooperative behaviour is observed more strongly among farm plot neighbours than 
among residential neighbours, possibly reflecting their interactions for irrigation 
                                                 
1
 We may place our investigation in the group of literature that deals with the 
development of social behaviour with possible mutuality, rather than in the literature on 
the evolutionary process of cooperation under completely unknown and non-repeated 
setting on which Bowles and Gintis (2011) focus. In this regard, our paper is in line 
with Binzel et al. (2003), Etang et al. (2011), and Goette et al. (2012) that investigate 
the effect of social ties in the real world on social behaviour in the experiments. 
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management in the real world. Third, a dissatisfaction message (a kind of costly 
punishment from group members) increases the contribution in the subsequent round of 
the public goods game in both ecosystems. Note, however, that the effect on free-riders is 
greater in the irrigated areas, indicating the emergence of a stronger community 
mechanism of punishment that compensates for the function of norms. These findings 
generally support the theory of norm evolution through common pool resource 
management.  
 Following this introduction, Section 2 provides the background of the study site 
and survey. Section 3 outlines the idea of neighbourhood effects in more depth and 
assembles our main hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the econometric methodology to 
estimate neighbourhood spillover effects. Section 5 explains our survey data by 
illustrating the experimental games used to elicit quantitative measures of farmers’ 
social behaviour, as well as describing the characteristics of possible determinants and 
control variables to be included in regressions. Section 6 compares neighbourhood 
structure between the irrigated and rainfed areas. Section 7 presents the results of the 
regression analysis, followed by a robustness check in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 offers 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Background of the Study Site and Survey 
Our study site is located in the northeastern part of Bohol, an island in the Central 
Visayas region belonging to Cebuano-speaking culture in the Philippines. As in other 
parts of the Philippines, traditional social relationships in the study area may be 
characterised as loosely structured, the concept first introduced by the classic work of 
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John Embree (1950) on Thailand contrasted with Japan (Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981, 
2000).
2
 Characteristics of this structure include the absence of a clear boundary of the 
community network, individualistic behaviour, and weak cohesion and solidarity 
(Embree 1950). The nature of this loose structure may be stronger in our study site 
because the places of residence are relatively scattered over a wide geographical area, 
rather than having a core residential area in the center of the community. 
 Characterization of our study site as loosely structured, however, does not mean 
that social interactions are thin altogether. Among several terms alleged to characterise 
the value system in the Philippines, two terms are often cited as important values; 
makikiusa, which means smooth interpersonal relationship by being united with the 
group, in particular by following the group decision, and utang na kabubut-on, which 
means a sense of indebtedness in receiving good treatments.
3
 These terms indicate the 
existence and importance of such relationships traditionally, although the structure is 
relatively loose.  
 The structural difference between a loose society and a tight one may stem from 
the ecological difference between non-irrigated Thai villages and irrigated Japanese 
villages at the time Embree compared the two societies. Based on his observations in 
Japan, he emphasised that the “joint working of community not only gets work done, but 
keeps the people together by uniting them in a common task and afterward in a common 
drinking party (Embree, 1939).” This assertion is consistent with the summary by Ostrom 
                                                 
2
 Of course, the degree of looseness differs among regions in the Philippines, including 
Ilocos which is known as a tight society. However, in general, many comparative 
studies of rural villages have discovered less tight structure in Southeast Asia, including 
the Philippines (Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981, 2000).  
3
 In Tagalog, which is the base of the official language of the country, the former 
becomes pakikisama and the latter becomes utang na loob.  
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(2000) which argues the evolution of tight social norms as a reaction to the necessity for 
collective management of common pool resources. We postulate that traditional 
relationship in the study area may be strengthened toward a tighter direction through 
irrigation management, as Embree and Ostrom observed.  
 The Bayongan irrigation system, located in the study area, began operation in 
2008. It is a typical gravity irrigation system consisting of a reservoir dam, canals, water 
intakes, and farm ditches. In principle, water from an intake is shared by a group of 
farmers. They form a water-users group (WUG), which collectively takes care of the 
construction and maintenance of farm ditches, control of water intake, water allocation 
among the members, and coordination with other WUGs. The system consists of 150 
WUGs with membership that ranges from 4 to 70 farmers and averages 20.  
 Under the current regulation, each irrigated farmer has to pay an irrigation 
service fee equivalent to 150 kg of paddy per hectare per season (an area-based pricing 
system) to the National Irrigation Administration.
4
 For the sake of other research 
projects, half of WUGs randomly selected receive as reward  a monetary equivalent of 
water savings based on consumed volume, while the other half by the current pricing 
method (i.e., zero marginal cost). Hence, the demand for collective water management 
for water savings is higher in the former set of WUGs than in the latter. This feature is 
utilised for testing our hypotheses. 
 The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) conducted a set of surveys on 
243 randomly selected rice farmers over four agricultural seasons from 2009 to 2010. 
The collection served as the individual-level primary dataset for our study. The survey 
                                                 
4
 This amount is equivalent to 2,500–3,000 Philippine Pesos (the market price of paddy 
being 14–20 Philippine Pesos per kg), or about 5% of gross revenue under the normal 
yield of 3 t/ha. 
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covers both irrigated areas and rainfed areas, where the sample sizes are 132 and 111, 
respectively. In order to make the comparison between the two agroecosystems 
meaningful, the rainfed sample was taken from the area adjacent to the irrigated area that 
was determined by the National Irrigation Administration as an irrigable area in the next 
phase of the Bayongan irrigation project. The soil type (sandy loam) is also the same in 
the two areas. Thus, the rainfed sample shares a similar background to the irrigated 
sample in that both are in the same cultural zone, with similar hydrological and soil 
conditions. This is further examined statistically in Sections 5 and 6.  
 The data set consists of household characteristics, the results of artefactual field 
experiments, and geographical coordinates. The geographical coordinates are recorded 
for both the farm plots and residences of the sample farmers, which allows us to define 
two types of neighbourhood (plot and residential) for each individual farmer.
5
 Figures 1 
and 2 present the locations of their residences and farm plots, respectively. 
 
3. Neighbourhood Effects and Hypotheses 
Ioannides and Topa (2010) delineate three sources of neighbourhood effects.
6
 First, the 
direct effects of neighbours’ outcome on the individual’s outcome are known as 
endogenous social effects. The propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies 
together with the prevalence of that behaviour in some reference group containing that 
individual. For instance, individuals care about their neighbours’ altruism, which then 
                                                 
5
 For farmers with multiple plots, the geo-coordinates of the most important plot 
self-claimed by the respondents are considered. 
6
  Depending on the context, neighbourhood effects can be called, “peer influences”, 
“conformity”, “imitation”, “contagion”, “epidemics”, “bandwagons”, “spatial 
externalities”, “herd behaviour”, “neighbourhood spillover”, or “interdependent 
preferences” (Manski, 1993). 
9 
 
affects their own altruism.
7
 That is, own decisions and the decisions of those in the 
same neighbourhood are, in some sense, mutually influential.
8
 Second, individuals also 
care about the personal characteristics of others, i.e., whether their neighbours are young 
or old, male or female, rich or poor, black or white, trendy or traditional, and so on. 
Such effects are known as exogenous social effects.
9
 Third, individuals in the same 
social settings may act similarly because they share common unobservable factors or 
face similar institutional environments. Such an interaction pattern is known as 
correlated social effects. A precursor to the concept is Manski (1993), who emphasised 
the difficulty in separately identifying endogenous effect from exogenous effect in linear 
models, as well as in identifying the two effects from correlated effect. Drawing on this 
argument, we attempt to explicitly distinguish the three sources of social effects in our 
econometric model (Section 4) while referring to all the three as “neighbourhood 
effects.”  
 One general note on the identification of neighbourhood effects is that it may 
suffer a self-selection problem (Manski, 1993; Goetti et al. 2012). Interdependence 
among individuals’ decisions and behaviour within a spatial or social milieu can be 
complicated by the fact that, in some circumstances, individuals can choose their own 
                                                 
7
 Endogenous social effects appear as long as one cares about the expected outcome of 
the others’ decision, even without observing others’ actual behaviour. One example is 
when a common rate of monetary contribution to ceremonies (weddings and funerals, 
for example) is implicitly set among the people. The co-variation of social behaviour in 
our case is another example.  
8
 Examples are nicely presented by Bandiera and Rasul (2006), who conducted a 
household survey on sunflower adoption in Mozambique, Case (1992), who did 
research on new technology adoption among rice farmers in Indonesia, and Conley and 
Udry (2003), who analyzed social learning of new technology in pineapple farming in 
Ghana.  
9
 In sociology literature, exogenous social effects are often referred to as “contextual 
effects.” 
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neighbourhood. In other words, individuals may choose their neighbourhood effects by 
choosing their residence or workplace or both. Such choices involve information that is 
unobservable to the researcher, and thus require inference about possible factors that 
contribute to their choices (Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Moffitt, 2001; Bandiera and Rasul, 
2006; Blume et al. 2010). In our analysis, however, the self-selection problem is 
negligible since we have confirmed in our interview that the farmers have not relocated 
or chosen their community since the introduction of the irrigation system. Sampson et al. 
(1999) also back up this point by indicating that the most reliable conditions in favour 
of neighbourhood effects are residential stability and low population density, among 
other things.
10
 
 The discussion above drives us to our main empirical questions on whether, in 
what cases, and in what ways farmers’ social behaviour is influenced by their 
neighbours’ behaviour and characteristics. The background of the study site indicates 
that some social interactions take place even in the rainfed area. Therefore, our first 
hypothesis to be tested is that social behaviour of individual farmers is influenced by 
their neighbours’ social behaviour and personal attributes. 
 Second, social interdependencies become stronger if individuals share a 
common pool resource and social space that may generate constraints on individual 
actions (Ostrom, 2000; Aoki, 2001; Hayami and Godo, 2005; Ioannides and Topa, 2010). 
Because the introduction of irrigation systems increases the demand for collective 
management of communal water resources among the spatial neighbours (Ostrom, 2000; 
Aoki, 2001; Fujiie et al. 2005; Hayami, 2009), our second hypothesis is that 
                                                 
10
 To be more specific, they found that the most reliable conditions are low population 
density, residential stability, and concentrated affluence rather than concentrated 
poverty, racial/ethnic composition, and individual-level covariates. 
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neighbourhood effects on social behaviour, particularly on contribution to public goods , 
are greater in the irrigated area vis à vis in the rainfed area. 
 Third, by the same token, volumetric pricing should be an incentive, more than 
area-based pricing in which the marginal cost of using water is zero, for better collective 
action toward irrigation water savings. Hence, our third hypothesis is that, in irrigated 
areas, farmers are more contributory to public goods when they are engaged in a 
volumetric incentive system than in an area-based flat rate system. 
 Fourth, the second and third hypotheses imply that neighbourhood effects on 
public goods contribution may be greater when we consider farm field neighbours than 
residential neighbours, as collective actions must be required more intensively in field 
work than in residential life. Sampson et al. (2002) also emphasise the need for looking 
into social interactions at school or workplace, despite common practice in 
neighbourhood-effects research of looking solely at the place of residence. Accordingly, 
our fourth hypothesis is that the endogenous social effects on public goods contribution 
are more salient among farm plot neighbours than among residential neighbours.  
 
4. Spatial Econometric Model 
Our estimation procedure starts with a general a-spatial model where a farmer’s social 
behaviour depends only on his/her own socioeconomic characteristics: 
                (1) 
where  represents an N × 1 series measurement of social behaviour (altruistic or 
contributory behaviour) of individual farmers;  represents an N × K matrix 
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containing vectors of K variables that measure the individual agricultural and 
socioeconomic characteristics; and   represents the residual or error term.  
 To include a neighbourhood structure in the model, an N × N weight matrix 
 is constructed from the geographical coordinates of N sampled farmers. In this paper, 
the weight matrix is based on the arc distance between observations. First, we create a 
binary matrix with elements coded 1 when two observations (spatial units) are 
neighbours, and 0 otherwise. Hence, by definition, the diagonal elements of the matrix, 
which describe the self-relationship, are all zeros. In this paper, we start with the matrix 
constructed by imposing the shortest possible threshold distance, which ensures that all 
observations (spatial units) have at least one neighbour. Different kinds of weight matrix 
are examined for a robustness check. The binary matrix is row-standardised to ensure that 
the row sum is equal to unity. In order to test the fourth hypothesis, two forms of 
neighbourhood structures are considered: residential neighbourhood    and farm plot 
neighbourhood  , so that we can investigate which type of neighbours is more 
influential on farmers’ social behaviour. 
 The exogenous social effects as discussed in Section 3 are systematically 
modeled by Autant-Bernard and LeSage (2011) into a spatial econometrics framework. 
Algebraically, Eq. (1) can be modified to include the influence of neighbours’ 
characteristics as: 
                    (2) 
where    (s = r, p) is an N × N weight matrix, and    is an N × K matrix 
containing vectors of the neighbours’ weighted averages of the K variables. This 
specification is also referred to as cross-regressive model. 
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Spatial diagnostic tests are then performed on the residual    to determine the 
appropriate spatial process (see Anselin et al. 1996). Performing a set of Lagrange 
multiplier tests and following the procedure outlined in Anselin et al. (1996), the 
candidate specification can be (a) spatial lag model
11
 (with spatially lagged independent 
variables), (b) spatial error model (with spatially lagged independent variables), (c) the 
combination of the two (ARAR model with spatially lagged independent variables), and 
(d) cross-regressive model (i.e., Eq. (2)). The specifications (a)-(c) are expressed as 
follows: 
(a)         +                 (3) 
(b)                 ,                     (4) 
(c)         +             ,     =        +     (5) 
where the coefficients  ,  , and  capture the endogenous social effects, exogenous 
social effects, and correlated social effects, respectively, along the lines of the 
discussion in Section 3. The coefficient  indicates the degree of co-variation of social 
behaviour among the neighbours. Therefore, we may name it the Makikiusa parameter 
that could capture the strength of the traditional social norm of being united with the 
others. These three models are estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) 
procedures, using commands defined in an R package.
12
 
 The estimated coefficients for the models in Eqs. (3) and (5) cannot be 
interpreted directly as marginal effects. More transformations are needed to come up 
with marginal effects associated with a change in any continuous variable used in these 
models. The total marginal effect can also be decomposed into direct and indirect 
                                                 
11
 It is also often referred to as spatial autoregressive model. 
12
 R is free computational software. For more details visit http://cran.r-project.org/ 
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effects. Given that the main goal of the paper is to compare the estimated coefficients 
between irrigated and rainfed rice farmers, the marginal effects are not shown.
13
 
 
5. Survey Data 
5.1 Agricultural and Socioeconomic Variables 
Agricultural and socioeconomic variables constitute the vector of variables   
described in Section 4., This paper employs, among the collected variables, farmer’s age 
(year), gender (dummy, =1 if male), years of schooling (year), field size (ha), asset 
(Philippine Pesos, P hereafter)
14
, household size (person)
15
, and female ratio of the 
household (proportion) as well as pricing system for irrigation water (dummy, =1 if 
volumetric reward), to see whether any of these variables of themselves or/and of their 
neighbours can explain the social behaviour.
16
 The average is calculated over four crop 
seasons for field size, asset, household size, and female ratio.
17
 Logarithm is considered 
for the asset variable to exhibit a distribution that is much closer to normal distribution. 
The sample mean and standard error of these variables are summarised by irrigation 
status in Table 1. 
 To validate the comparison of neighbourhood effects between the irrigated and 
rainfed samples, albeit we have sampled rainfed farmers from the area with similar 
                                                 
13
 Marginal effects are available from authors upon request. 
14
 Asset is included as an indicator of farmers’ general wealth level. It consists of 
agricultural, non-agricultural, and livestock assets. 
15
 Household size is defined as the number of household members. 
16
 To circumvent a multicollinearity problem, the coefficient of correlation was 
checked for all the combinations of variables included together in any regression, and 
was confirmed to be at most 0.35 in the absolute term.  
17
 In most parts of the Philippines, rice is cultivated twice a year, i.e., in the rainy 
season and the dry season. 
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background to the irrigated area, it is required that the difference in social behaviour 
arises from the difference in the way farmers interact due to their ecosystem, but not as 
much from the difference in intrinsic demographical factors. The rightmost column in 
Table 1 presents the t-test diagnostics for the mean difference in the mentioned 
variables between the two ecosystems. The only highly significant difference is found 
for field size. From our field observation, we noted that the rainfed farmers tended to 
overestimate the size of their land, while the irrigated farmers knew the exact size of their 
fields as these were measured by the irrigation authority when the irrigation system was 
introduced.
18
 Nevertheless, attention is paid to this variable when discussing the 
regression results. For all other variables, however, the mean difference is neither 
statistically significant nor large in magnitude. We therefore assume that there is little 
intrinsic difference between the irrigated and rainfed samples, except the ecosystem 
itself. 
 
5.2 Experimental Games Design 
Our dependent variables are the indicators of social behaviour, which are the results of 
our artefactual field experiments. To elicit farmers’ social behaviour, IRRI conducted 
two types of experimental games at the end of the last survey season, following a 
standard protocol: (1) the dictator game for measuring altruistic behaviour, and (2) 
repeated public goods game for measuring contributory behaviour to public work.
19
 
                                                 
18
 For some rainfed farmers, we compared farmer’s self-estimation and GPS 
measurement, and found their tendency to overestimate.  
19
 We follow the experimental protocol of Carpenter et al. (2004), Schechter (2007), 
Carpenter and Seki (2011), and Aoyagi et al. (2013). Our instructions appear in 
Appendix A. In the experiment session, we conducted two additional games: the 
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Dictator Game 
 This game is played by an arbitrary pair of individuals: a dictator and a receiver. 
The dictator is not informed of who his/her partner is, and vice-versa. The dictator is 
given P 100, which is equivalent to two-thirds of the daily wage rate for a typical farmer 
in the study area, while the receiver is given no money in the beginning. Then, the 
dictator is asked to choose the amount x   {0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100} to 
transfer to the receiver if the receiver is someone in the same village.
20
 We specify the 
type of receiver as a person from the same village, rather than anybody in a society, in 
order to let the participants feel spatial proximity with the receiver. The dominant 
strategy under the assumption of Homo economicus is no transfer. Hence, the reported 
amount is regarded as an indicator of each dictator’s altruistic behaviour within the 
village community. The game ends after a one-shot interaction. 
Two-rounds of the Public Goods Game, with Monitoring and Message 
 In the repeated public goods game experiment, participants are formed into 
groups of four persons within the same village, but are not informed of who their group 
members are. Then, each consisting member is given P 100 and is asked to choose an 
amount x   {0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100} to contribute to the group that 
he/she belongs to. The total amount contributed by all the members is doubled and then 
shared evenly among the members, regardless of whether each member contributes 
more or less than the others. Thus, the payoff function of this game is 
                                                                                                                                               
ultimatum game and the trust game. The final payoff of the experiment was revealed at 
the end of the entire session. 
20
 In our experimental games, village is expressed by the local term barangay, which is 
the smallest official administrative unit corresponding to the concept of village in 
general. 
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   (     )  (      )  
 
 
   (∑         ).  
The dominant strategy is no contribution, providing an incentive for free riding.  
 After the first round of the game, participants can, in secret, observethe 
contribution from each member by paying P 1. Then, one can send an anonymous 
‘unhappy’ signal to a particular member(s) to manifest his/her displeasure, with the cost 
of P 1 per message sent.
21
 This introduces costly punishment to the game. The second 
round of the game is played immediately after the first round, within the same groups. 
The amount of contribution provides a measure of the player’s contributory behaviour 
to public work, or anti-free-riding behaviour. 
 
5.3  Control Variables in the Public Goods Game Analysis 
Risk Preference 
One critical control variable in the estimation of the public goods game results 
may be the farmers’ individual risk-taking behaviour. Some theoretical researches on 
experimental games and social capital suggest that the propensity to transfer money in 
games like public goods game, in which the subject receives some amount back from 
the partner(s), should be closely associated with the willingness to take risks (Cook and 
Cooper, 2003; Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2001). These reports indicate that individuals’ 
propensity to bet in return-expected games is at least partly accounted for by their bet in 
a risk game. Hence, we also conducted a risk game experiment based on Schechter 
(2007). The game is played by one person only. The player receives P 100 and is given 
                                                 
21
 We used a so-called ‘unhappy’ face icon card to express the message of 
dissatisfaction. The cards are secretly given to the designated persons at the beginning 
of the second round of the game (Carpenter and Seki, 2011).   
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an opportunity to bet a share. The bet is multiplied by either 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, or 2.5, 
determined by the player drawing one of six cards bearing these numbers, with equal 
probabilities of being selected. The betted amount is recorded as an indicator of the 
individuals’ risk preference. 
Message Receipt Dummy 
The message receipt dummy (MRD) takes the value of 1 if the individual 
received at least one message of complaint from the group members after the first round 
of the public goods game, and 0 otherwise. The MRD variable is included in the 
regressions for the second round, and a positive coefficient is expected, on the grounds 
that the presence of peer pressure discourages free-riding behaviour.
22
 
Free-Riding Index 
The free-riding index (FRI) is defined as a product of two variables: (a) the 
average of the group members’ contribution minus one’s own contribution, which 
indicates the relative degree of free-riding within the group, and (b) the dummy of 
whether one checked the other group members’ contributions explicitly. The FRI is 
therefore intended to express recognition of one’s own free-riding level relative to the 
group members’.23 
                                                 
22
 We also performed regressions using the number of complaints received instead of 
the MRD. In that case, the coefficients were smaller and less significant. 
23
 We also tried including the variable (a) alone, instead of FRI, since one’s degree of 
free riding can be indirectly recognised through the return on the contribution. The 
regression results were not as clear as with the FRI. 
19 
 
The Interaction Term between MRD and FRI 
It is assumed that the effect of receiving messages augments when one is free 
riding and is aware of it. To control for this impact, the interaction term between the 
MRD and FRI is created and included in the regressions. 
Contribution in the First Round 
The most essential control in the second round is one’s own contribution in the first 
round. Onesa and Putterman (2007) point out that those individuals who contribute 
highly in the first round tend to contribute similarly in the second round. They conclude 
that public goods contribution is a somewhat persistent behaviour even in the presence 
of sanction. Thus, without controlling for this tendency, variables such as MRD would 
suffer a severe estimation bias.
24
 
 The descriptive statistics of the variables from the experimental games are 
summarised in Table 2, with a view of comparing the two samples. There is no 
significant mean difference in these variables, except that the dictator game result is 
slightly higher in the irrigated areas than in the rainfed areas. Tables 1 and 2 together 
suggest that farmers in the two ecosystems are not discernibly different. However, the 
mechanism of determination, particularly regarding neighbourhood effects, could be 
different.  
 
6. Neighbourhood Structure 
                                                 
24
 We checked and confirmed that the absence of this control variable inverts the sign 
of the coefficient on the MRD, due to a selection bias. 
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Four different weight matrices are constructed, corresponding to the four types of 
neighbourhoods considered: (a) plot neighbourhood for irrigated farmers, (b) plot 
neighbourhood for rainfed farmers, (c) residential neighbourhood for irrigated farmers, 
and (d) residential neighbourhood for rainfed farmers.  
A threshold distance criterion is used to construct the neighbourhood structure. 
For a given farmer, all other farmers located within the radius of the threshold distance 
are considered his/her neighbours. The threshold distance is determined such that all 
individuals have at least one neighbour. Different kinds of weight matrices are later 
examined for a robustness check.
 
 
 We created the weight matrices by using the threshold distance in each of the 
four neighbourhoods. The threshold distance (in kilometers) for each matrix turned out 
to be 0.959, 1.302, 0.956, and 1.376 for neighbourhood (a), (b), (c), and (d), 
respectively. Since our purpose is to undertake a fair comparison among the 
neighbourhoods, we impose a uniform threshold distance for all matrices, for which we 
choose the shortest of the four. Hence, the uniform threshold distance of 0.956 km is 
applied. As a result, a few observations were dropped from neighbourhoods (a), (b), and 
(d).
25
 
 Table 3 summarises the characteristics of the four weight matrices. The 
imposition of the uniform threshold distance seems to be reflected in the insignificant 
mean difference in average neighbour distance between the two ecosystems. The 
average number of neighbours per individual and the average distance between 
neighbours are in a trade-off relationship. The t-test suggests more neighbours in the 
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 Two observations were dropped from neighbourhood (b) and one from (d) because 
they had no neighbours. Therefore, the sample size in the rainfed area became 111. 
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rainfed areas than in the irrigated areas. We control for this in the robustness check with a 
different kind of weight matrix.  
 
7. Spatial Regression Results 
7.1 Spatial Model Selection 
 To identify the appropriate spatial process for consideration in the regression 
analysis, Lagrange multiplier tests were performed on the residuals of the 
cross-regressive estimations for each of the twelve cases (three games multiplied by 
four spatial weights). The test statistics and our corresponding model choice are 
summarised in Table 4. The appropriate spatial model is chosen following the procedure 
outlined in Anselin et al. (1996). In a few cases, an alternative model was also estimated 
for the purpose of checking the robustness of estimated parameters. 
 
7.2 Estimation Results 
 Tables 5, 6, and 7 present the estimation results for the dictator game, public 
goods game round 1, and public goods game round 2, respectively. 
Dictator Game 
 In the irrigated areas, the Makikiusa parameter  is found to be positive and 
significant, according to the results for neighbourhoods (a) and (c) (with the first model). 
This finding indicates that farmers’ altruistic behaviour positively co-varies with the 
neighbours’ altruistic behaviour, resulting in homogeneous social behaviour among 
neighbours. Importantly, it is not a covariate shock but the altruistic behaviour itself that 
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causes this mutual dependence, as indicated by the specification diagnosis. It is thus 
inferred that the introduction and availability of irrigation that requires collective 
management promoted social interactions and behavioural spillovers, which led to the 
emergence of a kind of social norm. In comparing the magnitude of  between (a) and 
(c), we may claim that the endogenous social effect is larger and more significant 
among residential neighbours than among plot neighbours. It may be the case that 
altruistic actions are associated more with daily life activities around their residences 
than with farming activities on the fields.  
As for the exogenous social effects, the only highly significant effect is found in 
field size among plot neighbours. It is shown that farmers who interact with large 
landholders are more altruistic, regardless of their own landholding. In comparing (a) 
and (c), the field size effect is weaker among residential neighbours than among plot 
neighbours, probably because land size is less visible to residential neighbours. 
Among the own characteristics, the effect of household female ratio is positive 
and significant. Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) report a similar finding that people from 
certain groups are more generous and equalitarian when women are a majority in the 
group, which may suggest that members of a female-dominant family tend to be more 
altruistic. 
In rainfed areas, on the other hand, no endogenous social effect or co-variation of 
altruistic behaviour is detected. Farmers’ own land size, however, might have a positive 
effect on their altruism. In the absence of intensive collective actions, individual farmers’ 
altruistic behaviour is, at least partially, determined by the abundance of his/her land 
resource. At any rate, rainfed farmers’ altruistic behaviour seems to be rather 
individually than mutually influenced. 
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Public Goods Game, First Round 
 In the first round of the public goods game, co-variation of contributory 
behaviour is not found in any of the four types of neighbourhoods. This result may 
indicate that before individuals are exposed to the result of monitoring actions exercised 
by community members, they do not align their contributory behaviour with that of their 
neighbours. The influence from neighbours’ characteristics (i.e., exogenous social effect) 
is generally weak as well. By no means, farmers’ contributory behaviour is clearly 
influenced by community members, provided no peer effect is in operation in the first 
round. 
Turning to the own characteristics, the most decisive factor is found to be age, of 
which the coefficients are negative and highly significant.
26
 Since public goods 
contribution has an aspect of investment, the decision must be associated with 
individual time preference. According to Read and Read (2004), older people discount 
time more than younger ones, which explains our estimated coefficients.
27 
Comparing 
the two ecosystems, a positive effect of field size is found in the irrigated areas, whereas 
the coefficient is negative and insignificant in the rainfed areas.
 
Although this result 
seems somewhat puzzling, a possible interpretation is that large holders of irrigated land 
depend on collective actions for irrigation maintenance, while in rainfed areas, large 
holders are relatively self-sufficient. In other words, for large holders, the incentive for 
community investment is relatively high in the irrigated areas. Volumetric water pricing 
                                                 
26
 Quadratic function of age was also examined. However, the coefficients on the 
quadratic terms were always insignificant. We have thus removed that term. 
27
 Some studies present contrasting findings. Chao et al. (2009) find an insignificant 
age effect on time preference while Aldy and Viscusi (2007) report an inverted U 
relation. Nevertheless, the downward sloping part of the inverted U may correspond to 
our result, since a majority of our sample famers are middle-aged or elderly. 
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has no effect. As expected, risk preference is positively linked with public goods 
contribution, particularly in irrigated areas, which may be caused by the investment 
mindset being more established in irrigated areas. 
Public Goods Game, Second Round  
In the second round of the public goods game, farmers’ contributory behaviour, 
with the influence of monitoring and messaging, is expected to manifest. In the irrigated 
areas, the Makikiusa parameter, , is found to be positive and highly significant, in 
particular for plot neighbours. Comparing the magnitude of  between (a) and (c), this 
endogenous social effect is greater and more significant among plot neighbours than 
among residential neighbours, which must be attributed to collective irrigation 
management conducted primarily in cooperation with plot neighbours, but not as much 
with residential neighbours. As in the first round of the game, the exogenous social 
effects are generally weak. Among the own characteristics, the effect of age becomes 
much less significant compared with the first round. Under pressure of monitoring, the 
volumetric pricing dummy has positive coefficients, although the statistical significance 
is not considerably high. 
In the rainfed areas, on the other hand, no endogenous social effect is detected. 
Anyhow, rainfed farmers’ contributory behaviour seems to be largely independent of 
others. 
The estimation as to the monitoring-related control variables deserves close 
attention. The coefficients on MRD are positive and significant all over, indicating that 
farmers increase their contribution when they explicitly receive an ‘unhappy’ message 
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from the group members.
28
 The result is consistent with the studies that show the 
effectiveness of costly punishment (Feher and Gächter, 2000; Ostrom, 2000; Bowles and 
Gintis, 2002). FRI shows a positive impact only in the irrigated areas. Since this index 
represents farmers’ awareness of their own free-riding behaviour, it indicates that 
irrigated farmers are willing to adjust their contribution voluntarily when they notice 
their own over-contribution or under-contribution. This result provides another evidence 
of irrigated farmers’ tendency to emulate others, or the emergence of social norms. The 
MRD-FRI interaction term exhibits a positive impact in the irrigated areas, which 
means that receipt of complaints is even more effective when combined with the 
awareness of one’s own free-riding behaviour. In other words, in the irrigated areas, 
free-riders are more responsive to messages of dissatisfaction whilein the rainfed areas, 
farmers respond to complaints more or less uniformly regardless of free riding. This 
result may indicate the emergence of a stronger community mechanism in the irrigated 
areas, which compensates for the social norm for the prevention of free riding. Lastly, 
contribution in the first round of the game plays a crucial role as a control variable. 
 
7.3  Summary of Findings 
 In view of our hypotheses, the findings are summarised as follows. First, 
neighbourhood effects on farmers’ social behaviour are identified in this study. The 
endogenous social effects among irrigated farmers are found in the estimations of the 
dictator game and of the second round of the public goods game. The exogenous social 
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 The coefficients appear to be smaller in the irrigated areas. However, the total effect 
of MRD must incorporate the cross effect of the MRD-FRI interaction as well. Since the 
interaction term is significant only in the irrigated areas, the total effect of MRD is not 
considerably different between the two ecosystems. 
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effects are minor on the whole, whereas no correlated social effects are found. 
Hypothesis 1 is accepted to the extent that it depends on the irrigation availability and 
the type of social behaviour. Second, there is a clear contrast between the results from 
the two ecosystems. The endogenous social effects and the impact of FRI are found 
only in the irrigated areas, which definitely supports Hypothesis 2. Third, volumetric 
water pricing makes no difference in the outcome of the dictator game and 
pre-monitoring public goods game, though it has a minimal positive effect in the second 
round of the public goods  game. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is only weakly supported. Fourth, 
in comparing between plot and residential neighbourhoods, the spillover of public goods 
contribution under monitoring is stronger among plot neighbours. Hence, Hypothesis 4 
is clearly accepted. 
 
8. Robustness to Alternative Weight Matrix 
There are different methods of defining the weight matrix. This section briefly examines 
how robust and valid our results are by estimating the model using three other definitions 
of neighbours. A popular method, aside from the use of a threshold distance, is to impose 
a k-nearest-neighbour criterion in which a specified number of nearest neighbours (k) to 
each individual are defined as neighbours, so that everyone has the same number of 
designated neighbours. Here we set k to be 6 in view of the average number of neighbours 
in our main model, which is about 6 and 11 in irrigated and rainfed areas, respectively 
(Table 3). We denote this matrix as [W1]. An argument may be made that endogenous 
social effects are not found in rainfed areas due to the inclusion of many (i.e., far) 
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neighbours that causes a possible noise in identifying true neighbour effects. Hence, it is 
interesting to examine the six-nearest-neighbour structure applied to both ecosystems.  
 Both the threshold distance method and the k-nearest-neighbour method employ 
binary weight models, i.e., observations are defined as either neighbours or 
non-neighbours, nothing in between. A method that contrasts with these is the use of a 
model in which the neighbourhood influence gradually decreases with distance. We 
consider a distance decay function defined as inverse distance, and this matrix is denoted 
as [W2].
29
  
 Lastly, we examine a model in which all the residents in the same village are 
considered as neighbours, and those outside the village as non-neighbours. This is 
denoted as [W3]. Defining neighbourhoods by administrative unit is a method that has 
been employed in conventional neighbourhood effect studies, although not in the form of 
applying spatial econometrics techniques. Note that plot neighbourhood is not defined in 
this approach because village membership is based on residency. 
 The estimation results using the three weight matrices are presented in Table 8 
for the dictator game and round 1 of the public goods game and Table 9 for round 2 of the 
public goods game). For succinctness, only the variables of major interest are shown.
30
 
As to W1, positive endogenous social effects are found in the irrigated areas, although to 
a lesser extent compared with the main model. In the dictator game, the effects are smaller 
and statistically less significant. In round 2 of the public goods game, the effect is as large 
and significant in the plot neighbourhood as in the main model, while a correlated social 
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 Needless to say, there are a number of differing methods to define non-threshold type 
models, e.g., exponential decay. 
30
 See Appendix B for the neighbourhood characteristics and the full regression results. 
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effect is detected for the residential neighbourhood, indicating a spatial correlation not 
necessarily caused by a direct spillover from neighbours.  
On the whole, however, the results from the 6–nearest-neighbours model 
support the robustness of our main results. As to W2, the statistical significance of the 
endogenous social effects is notably lower, though the magnitude seems larger. This 
observation suggests that distant residents do not contribute as largely to behavioural 
spillover as nearby neighbours, since the model takes into account influences from quite 
distant neighbours to a certain extent. Still, the results from the distance decay weight 
matrix are also somewhat supportive of the robustness of our main results. As to W3, 
neither spatial lag model nor ARAR model is suggested by the spatial diagnostic tests in 
any game. In other words, no endogenous social effect is found in this neighbourhood 
model. An important clue is the average number of village members is 24, and thus 
village members who reside not so nearby are modeled in equally with those really 
nearby, presumably causing a noise in identifying the behavioural spillover. 
 These robustness checks seem to reveal two points: first, our main results are 
robust to the specification of alternative weight matrices. In particular, from the results 
with W1, it turns out that the difference in the average number of neighbours between the 
two ecosystems in our main model is not the cause of the presence and absence of a 
behavioural spillover in the irrigated and rainfed areas, respectively. This clearly supports 
our view of behavioural spillover being induced by collective irrigation management. 
Second, the threshold distance model has superiority over the three variants in terms of 
modeling the spatial spillover of social behaviour. In the context of irrigation 
management, distance, rather than village membership or uniformity in the number of 
neighbours, may play a key role in promoting social interaction. 
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9. Concluding Remarks 
The study has provided insights into the emergence of social norms for pro-social 
behaviour and community mechanisms induced through the experience of 
community-based natural resource management. The most remarkable finding is that 
only in the irrigated areas do farmers’ altruistic behaviour and contributory behaviour 
co-vary with their neighbours’. Provided there is no innate difference in behavioural 
traits between irrigated and rainfed rice farmers, which is partially supported by the 
descriptive tables, our result indicates that collective actions required in irrigation water 
management are likely to induce the emergence of social norms, in which farmers 
decide their social behaviour to be more or less similar to their neighbours.’ Note, 
however, that this finding also implies that outcomes may not necessarily be pro-social 
because neighbourhood effect can reduce the high contributors’ contribution to the 
neighbours’ level, indicating the possibility of a vicious consequence of a 
conformism-type of norm dissemination. 
 Our analysis also shows that farmers’ positive corrective response to their own 
free-riding behaviour in the irrigated areas may be also regarded as the emergence of 
social norms, through which individuals’ free-riding acts are voluntarily corrected. 
While the message of dissatisfaction, a kind of costly punishment, effectively increases 
contribution in both ecosystems, the effect is greater on free riders only in the irrigated 
areas. It is thus inferred that increased demand for cooperative resource management in 
the real world also promotes a community mechanism of punishment that compensates 
for the function of social norms. Even though there are cooperative activities, such as the 
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maintenance of communal spaces and the construction of village roads, that are equally 
common in both irrigated and rainfed areas, a distinct behavioural difference between the 
two ecosystems is detected. This is a thought-provoking observation on the impact of 
increased demand for collective irrigation water management on the evolution of social 
norms and community mechanisms.  
 Another important note is that the irrigation systems in the study site were 
introduced rather recently—two years before the data collection—which implies that by 
intervention schemes such as the construction of gravity irrigation, changes in social 
norms and community mechanisms can take place rather rapidly. This finding may not 
be surprising, as Goette et al. (2012) find that the tendency of cooperation and norm 
enforcement in the experimental games emerges after a few weeks of group formation in 
real society. Sustainability of new norms and community mechanisms amidst increasing 
heterogeneity among farmers, as well as within the experience of success or failure in 
irrigation management, is another important issue that we will leave for future research.  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Agricultural and Socioeconomic Variables by 
Irrigation Availability 
  
(1) 
Overall 
(N=243) 
(2) 
Irrigated Areas 
(N=132) 
(3) 
Rainfed Areas 
(N=111) 
(4) 
t-test for 
mean 
difference 
(3)-(2) 
[p-value]   
           
   Volumetric Pricing Dummy  0.561       
   (0.498)       
   Age 51.062 49.689 52.694 3.004 * 
  (12.019) (12.248) (11.585) [0.052]   
   Gender Dummy 0.708 0.758 0.649 0.109 * 
  (0.456) (0.430) (0.480) [0.063]   
   Years of Schooling 6.395 6.144 6.694 0.550   
  (3.0384) (2.922) (3.159) [0.160]   
   Ln Asset 10.578 10.444 10.738 0.295   
  (1.132) (1.193) (1.038) [0.718]   
   Field Size (ha) 1.585 1.167 1.754 0.586 *** 
 (1.058) (0.682) (1.228) [0.000]   
   Household Size (head count) 5.936 6.144 5.689 0.455   
  (2.302) (2.321) (2.265) [0.125]   
   Household Female Ratio 0.500 0.484 0.519 0.035 * 
 (0.162) (0.148) (0.176) [0.092]   
 
Note: The sample means are presented. The standard deviations are in parentheses. *** and * indicate 1% 
and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively, for the mean difference between irrigated and rainfed 
areas. For the mean difference, absolute values are presented. 
Source: Authors’ calculation, with data collected by IRRI.  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for the Artefactual Field Experiment Results by Irrigation 
Availability 
 
  
(1) 
Overall 
(N=243) 
(2) 
Irrigated Areas 
(N=132) 
(3) 
Rainfed Areas 
(N=111) 
(4) 
t-test for 
mean 
difference 
(3)-(2) 
[p-value]   
Dependent Variables           
   Dictator Game 30.041 32.197 27.477 4.719 * 
  (20.236) (21.555) (18.314) [0.070]   
   PG Game, Round 1 54.403 53.182 55.856 2.674   
  (23.033) (22.080) (24.139) [0.368]   
   PG Game, Round 2 52.140 51.818 52.523 0.704   
  (24.350) (23.633) (25.279) [0.823]   
Controls           
   Risk Preference 53.786 54.470 52.973 1.497   
  (25.898) (24.380) (27.686) [0.655]   
   PG Game, Rround 1 Message 
Receipt Dummy 
0.280 0.273 0.288 0.016   
  (0.450) (0.447) (0.455) [0.789]   
   PG Game, Rround 1 Free-riding 
Index (FRI) 
-0.110 0.455 -0.781 1.235   
  (15.335) (14.746) (16.049) [0.533]   
Note: The standard deviations are in parentheses. * indicates 10% statistical significance level for the 
mean difference between irrigated and rainfed areas. For the mean difference, absolute values are 
presented. 
Source: Authors’ calculation with data collected by IRRI. 
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Table 3 Neighbourhood Structure: Characteristics of the 4 Weight Matrices 
  
------- Field Plot Neighbours ------- -------- Residential Neighbours 
------- 
  (1) 
Irrigated 
Areas 
(2) 
Rainfed 
Areas 
(3) 
t-test for 
mean 
difference 
(2)-(3) 
[p-value] 
(4) 
Irrigated 
Areas 
(5) 
Rainfed 
Areas 
(6) 
t-test for 
mean 
difference 
(5)-(4) 
[p-value]   
Weight Code (a) (b)  (c) (d)  
Number of Observations 131 109   132 110   
Total Number of Links 860 1166   866 1292   
Non-zero Weights (%) 5.01 9.81   4.97 10.68   
Average Number of 
Neighbours 6.565 10.697 4.132 6.561 11.746 5.185 
 per Person (2.649) (4.309) [0.000] (3.119) (5.409) [0.000] 
Average Distance between  0.603 0.587 0.016 0.583 0.574 0.009 
Neighbours (km) (0.236) (0.239) [0.137] (0.243) (0.252) [0.414] 
       
Note: Threshold Distance = 0.956 (km) is the distance that ensures that, for any one of the four neighbourhood structures, there is at least one neighbour for every 
observation. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 4 Diagnostic Tests for Spatial Regressions 
 
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15 % statistical significance levels, respectively.
Game Experiment
Neighborhood
Ecosystem Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed
Weight Code (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Moran's I 0.042 * -0.031 0.131 *** -0.126 -0.087 0.060 *** 0.004 -0.010 0.119 *** -0.016 0.162 *** 0.014 *
(0.050) (0.385) (0.001) (0.990) (0.849) (0.004) (0.246) (0.219) (0.000) (0.241) (0.000) (0.081)
         
0.616 5.332 ** 1.511 5.001 ** 8.135 *** 0.083
Error Correlation (0.433) (0.021) (0.219) (0.025) (0.004) (0.773)
3.034 * 7.854 *** 1.831 10.961 *** 9.849 *** 0.974
Lag Correlation (0.082) (0.005) (0.176) (0.001) (0.002) (0.324)
12.977 *** 2.540 † 0.623 0.375 0.214 1.165

Error Correlation (0.000) (0.111) (0.430) (0.540) (0.644) (0.281)
15.395 *** 5.062 ** 0.943 6.335 ** 1.928 2.055

Lag Correlation (0.000) (0.024) (0.332) (0.012) (0.165) (0.152)
16.011 *** 10.394 *** 2.453 11.336 *** 10.062 *** 2.138
SARMA (0.000) (0.006) (0.293) (0.003) (0.007) (0.343)
           
Lag
and
Cross
Cross
Lag
and
Cross
Cross Cross Cross Cross Cross
Lag
and
Cross
Cross Cross Cross
ARAR
and
Cross
Lag
and
Cross
For Robustness
Check
LM on
LM on
Robust LM on
Robust LM on
LM on
Spatial Model of
Our Choice
Dictator Game Public Goods Game, Round 1 Public Goods Game, Round 2
Field Plot Residential Field Plot Residential Field Plot Residential
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Table 5 Spatial Regressions for the Dictator Game 
Neighbourhood Field Plot  Residential 
             
Ecosystem Irrigated  Rainfed   Irrigated Rainfed  
               
Spatial Model 
Lag & 
Cross 
 Cross   
Lag & 
Cross 
 
ARAR & 
Cross 
 Cross  
Weight Code (a)  (b)   (c)  (c)  (d)  
Endogenous Social Effect            
   0.239 *    0.352 *** 0.331    
   (0.078)     (0.004)  (0.430)    
Correlated Social Effect            
           0.034    
          (0.948)    
Neighbours' Characteristics            
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy -13.630 *    -11.492 † -11.601 †   
    (0.089)     (0.109)  (0.150)    
  Age 0.123  0.060   -0.105  -0.128  0.445  
    (0.740)  (0.923)   (0.763)  (0.763)  (0.505)  
  Gender Dummy 4.382  -24.624 *  11.062  11.584  8.701  
    (0.589)  (0.077)   (0.195)  (0.258)  (0.514)  
  Years of schooling -0.750  -4.222 *  -1.288  -1.322  1.294  
    (0.609)  (0.062)   (0.391)  (0.383)  (0.617)  
  Ln Asset -0.887  10.944 *  5.075  5.230  -1.344  
    (0.827)  (0.051)   (0.200)  (0.218)  (0.735)  
  Field Area (ha) 16.206 *** 3.016   8.419 † 8.361  4.183  
    (0.008)  (0.587)   (0.135)  (0.194)  (0.426)  
  Household Size -2.513 † -2.327   -1.876  -1.895  -2.070  
    (0.140)  (0.545)   (0.275)  (0.317)  (0.525)  
  Household Female Ratio -2.364  -2.837   21.705  23.196  -5.491  
    (0.942)  (0.934)   (0.440)  (0.500)  (0.893)  
Own Characteristics            
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy -2.131     -0.327  -0.371    
    (0.543)     (0.922)  (0.915)    
  Age -0.201  -0.091   -0.263 * -0.266 * -0.121  
    (0.186)  (0.607)   (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.487)  
  Gender Dummy 2.914  3.098   3.526  3.605  5.631 † 
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    (0.484)  (0.433)   (0.385)  (0.407)  (0.143)  
  Years of Schooling 0.610  0.282   0.221  0.213  0.334  
    (0.341)  (0.663)   (0.734)  (0.748)  (0.615)  
  Ln Asset -0.374  0.854   -0.308  -0.290  -0.347  
    (0.820)  (0.653)   (0.849)  (0.863)  (0.859)  
  Field Area (ha) -0.118  2.322 †  -0.956  -0.920  2.324 † 
    (0.967)  (0.135)   (0.723)  (0.745)  (0.127)  
  Household Size -0.323  0.261   -0.377  -0.387  0.462  
    (0.664)  (0.759)   (0.613)  (0.610)  (0.613)  
  Household Female Ratio 29.147 ** 3.188   30.608 ** 30.845 ** -4.975  
    (0.013)  (0.905)   (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.629)  
Intercept 31.840  -52.679   -29.964  -30.609 † 10.964  
   (0.470)  (0.441)   (0.494)  (0.150)  (0.846)  
Sample Size 131  109   132  132  110  
Fit of the Model            
  Multiple R-squared   0.206       0.136  
  Adjusted R-squared   0.088       0.009  
  F Statistic   1.746 *      1.071  
      (0.059)       (0.394)  
  Wald Statistic 3.865 **    11.480 ***     
    (0.049)     (0.001)      
  LR Test        8.159 **   
           (0.017)    
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, respectively.  
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Table 6 Spatial Regressions for the Public Goods Game, Round 1 
Neighbourhood Field Plot  Residential 
           
Ecosystem Irrigated  Rainfed   Irrigated  Rainfed  
Spatial Model Cross  Cross   Cross  Cross  
Weight Code (a)  (b)   (c)  (d)  
Neighbours' Characteristics          
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy -9.637     -11.411 †   
    (0.273)     (0.147)    
  Age -0.623 † 0.548   -0.682 * -0.520  
    (0.131)  (0.516)   (0.074)  (0.559)  
  Gender Dummy -9.676  19.125   -10.821  35.160 ** 
    (0.279)  (0.314)   (0.244)  (0.049)  
  Years of Schooling -0.152  -0.088   0.533  -1.508  
    (0.926)  (0.978)   (0.755)  (0.672)  
  Ln Asset 0.013  -3.671   3.425  -3.891  
    (0.998)  (0.624)   (0.440)  (0.462)  
  Field Area (ha) 8.575  -7.042   2.966  5.672  
    (0.190)  (0.347)   (0.633)  (0.418)  
  Household Size -1.822  -0.502   1.453  0.633  
    (0.328)  (0.924)   (0.440)  (0.884)  
  Household Female Ratio 11.186  11.712   -8.118  31.177  
    (0.751)  (0.798)   (0.790)  (0.567)  
Own Characteristics          
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy 0.221     0.217    
    (0.955)     (0.954)    
  Age -0.450 *** -0.713 *** -0.441 *** -0.743 *** 
    (0.008)  (0.004)   (0.008)  (0.002)  
  Gender Dummy -4.709  -3.032   -5.778  -2.514  
    (0.305)  (0.568)   (0.195)  (0.624)  
  Years of Schooling 0.112  -0.194   0.236  -0.044  
    (0.876)  (0.824)   (0.744)  (0.960)  
  Ln Asset 2.323  2.589   1.307  0.981  
    (0.201)  (0.312)   (0.465)  (0.708)  
  Field Area (ha) 5.586 * -2.125   5.754 * -1.965  
    (0.069)  (0.315)   (0.054)  (0.334)  
  Household Size -0.742  -0.717   -0.575  -0.889  
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    (0.367)  (0.531)   (0.486)  (0.469)  
  Household Female Ratio 20.000 † -18.463   18.812  -14.913  
    (0.125)  (0.191)   (0.155)  (0.286)  
Control          
  Risk-Taking Behaviour 0.227 *** 0.132   0.215 *** 0.135 † 
    (0.006)  (0.167)   (0.010)  (0.134)  
Intercept 69.559  87.550   39.920  121.884 † 
   (0.153)  (0.346)   (0.411)  (0.107)  
Sample Size 131  109   132  110  
Fit of the Model          
  Multiple R-squared 0.232  0.185   0.256  0.218  
  Adjusted R-squared 0.117  0.054   0.145  0.093  
  F Statistic 2.012 ** 1.409   2.302 *** 1.741 * 
    (0.016)  (0.159)   (0.005)  (0.056)  
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Spatial Regressions for the Public Goods Game, Round 2 
Neighbourhood Field Plot  Residential 
             
Ecosystem Irrigated  Rainfed   Irrigated Rainfed  
               
Spatial Model 
Lag & 
Ccross 
 Cross   Cross  
Lag & 
Cross 
 Cross  
Weight Code (a)  (b)   (c)  (c)  (d)  
Endogenous Social Effect            
   0.332 ***      0.284 ***   
   (0.001)       (0.004)    
Neighbours' characteristics            
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy 1.337     11.436 * -6.470    
    (0.831)     (0.076)  (0.258)    
  Age -0.317  -0.584   -0.276  -0.221  -0.579  
    (0.289)  (0.406)   (0.377)  (0.418)  (0.467)  
  Gender Dummy 0.439  14.381   -3.750  -1.077  25.875 † 
    (0.945)  (0.364)   (0.627)  (0.874)  (0.116)  
  Years of Schooling -2.103 * 3.266   1.360  0.428  1.365  
    (0.070)  (0.215)   (0.331)  (0.731)  (0.665)  
  Ln Asset 2.964  -0.095   -1.520  -1.265  -3.677  
    (0.354)  (0.988)   (0.680)  (0.694)  (0.437)  
  Field Area (ha) 0.574  2.848   8.166 † 3.265  4.391  
    (0.903)  (0.653)   (0.111)  (0.480)  (0.482)  
  Household Size -0.577  3.104   0.798  0.224  4.020  
    (0.670)  (0.485)   (0.606)  (0.868)  (0.301)  
  Household Female Ratio -8.270  19.684   35.690  -28.779  -19.813  
    (0.742)  (0.610)   (0.157)  (0.189)  (0.683)  
Own Characteristics            
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy 3.199     3.314  4.083 †   
    (0.243)     (0.280)  (0.128)    
  Age 0.167  -0.169   0.179  0.187 † -0.089  
    (0.170)  (0.429)   (0.193)  (0.120)  (0.692)  
  Gender Dummy 2.492  0.145   0.690  2.059  -0.156  
    (0.438)  (0.974)   (0.849)  (0.517)  (0.973)  
  Years of Schooling 0.371  0.214   0.385  0.366  0.322  
    (0.466)  (0.769)   (0.516)  (0.481)  (0.682)  
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  Ln Asset 1.746  0.954   1.110  1.330  0.387  
    (0.171)  (0.661)   (0.447)  (0.297)  (0.869)  
  Field Area (ha) -0.716  -2.529   1.028  0.302  -2.671 † 
    (0.749)  (0.154)   (0.681)  (0.890)  (0.142)  
  Household Size 0.613  0.219   0.567  0.517  0.144  
    (0.291)  (0.821)   (0.405)  (0.384)  (0.895)  
  Household Female Ratio 7.872  -5.448   2.114  5.034  -6.961  
    (0.393)  (0.663)   (0.846)  (0.598)  (0.586)  
Controls            
  Risk-Taking Behaviour 0.126 ** 0.252 *** 0.193 *** 0.161 *** 0.240 *** 
    (0.034)  (0.002)   (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.003)  
  Round 1, Message D 7.312 ** 11.574 **  7.139 * 7.416 ** 11.731 ** 
    (0.039)  (0.041)   (0.080)  (0.036)  (0.050)  
  
Round 1, Free-Riding Index 
(FRI) 
0.212 * 0.014   0.232 * 0.266 ** 0.093  
    (0.090)  (0.940)   (0.090)  (0.026)  (0.624)  
  Round 1, Message D x FRI 0.440 ** -0.358   0.471 * 0.419 ** -0.289  
    (0.044)  (0.238)   (0.053)  (0.047)  (0.361)  
  Round 1, Result 0.847 *** 0.542 *** 0.821 *** 0.840 *** 0.584 *** 
    (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Intercept -56.946 † -22.235   -2.661  -19.659  34.196  
   (0.117)  (0.774)   (0.949)  (0.587)  (0.620)  
Sample Size 131  109   132  132  110  
Fit of the Model            
  Multiple R-squared   0.511   0.591    0.476  
  Adjusted R-squared   0.406   0.513    0.365  
  F Statistic   4.884 *** 7.558 ***   4.300 *** 
      (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)  
  Wald Statistic 13.042 ***      9.141 ***   
    (0.000)       (0.002)    
 
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, respectively.   
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Table 8 Robustness Checks for Spatial Regressions: the Dictator Game and the Public Goods Game, Round 1 
Neighbourhood Field Plot  Residential 
           
Ecosystem Irrigated  Rainfed   Irrigated  Rainfed  
Dictator Game          
 [W1] 6-nearest Neighbours Model          
 Spatial Model Lag & Cross  Cross   Lag &Cross  Cross  
 Endogenous Social Effect () 0.195 †    0.238 †   
   (0.148)     (0.101)    
 Sample Size 131  109   132  110  
 [W2] 1/d Distance Decay Neighbourhood 
Model 
         
 Spatial Model Lag & Cross  Cross   Lag &Cross  Cross  
 Endogenous Social Effect () 0.484     0.487 †   
   (0.151)     (0.150)    
 Sample Size 131  109   132  110  
 [W3] Village Neighbours Model          
 Spatial Model      Cross  Cross  
 Endogenous Social Effect ()          
 Sample Size      129  110  
Public Goods Game, Round 1          
 [W1] 6-nearest Neighbours Model          
 Spatial Model Cross  Cross   Cross  Cross  
 Endogenous Social Effect ()          
 Sample Size 131  109   132  110  
 [W2] 1/d Distance Decay Neighbourhood 
Model 
         
 Spatial Model Cross  Cross   Cross  Cross  
 Endogenous Social Effect ()          
 Sample Size 131  109   132  110  
 [W3] Village Neighbours Model          
 Spatial Model      Cross  Cross  
 Endogenous Social Effect ()          
 Sample size      129  110  
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, respectively.
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Table 9 Robustness Checks for Spatial Regressions: the Public Goods Game, Round 2 
Neighbourhood Field plot  Residential 
          
Ecosystem Irrigated  Rainfed   Irrigated  Rainfed  
[W1] 6-nearest Neighbours Model          
Spatial Model 
Lag 
&Cross 
 Cross   
Error 
&Cross 
 Cross  
Endogenous Social Effect () 0.358 ***        
  (0.001)         
Correlated Social Effect ()      0.376 ***   
      (0.006)    
Round 1, Message D 7.480 ** 10.778 *  8.020 ** 9.978 * 
 (0.036)  (0.066)   (0.022)  (0.089)  
Round 1, Free-Riding Index (FRI) 0.229 * 0.040   0.296 ** 0.045  
 (0.065)  (0.835)   (0.013)  (0.807)  
Round 1, Message D x FRI 0.453 ** -0.253   0.350 * -0.220  
 (0.038)  (0.407)   (0.096)  (0.470)  
Sample Size 131  109   132  110  
[W2] 1/d Distance Decay Neighbourhood 
Model 
         
Spatial Model Cross  Cross   Cross  Cross  
Endogenous Social Effect () 0.510 *    0.514 *   
  (0.097)     (0.095)    
Round 1, Message D 7.370 ** 11.469 *  7.365 ** 12.808 * 
 (0.031)  (0.046)   (0.030)  (0.089)  
Round 1, Free-Riding Index (FRI) 0.289 ** 0.019   0.291 ** 0.071  
 (0.015)  (0.930)   (0.014)  (0.807)  
Round 1, Message D x FRI 0.309 † -0.220   0.305  -0.232  
 (0.150)  (0.477)   (0.154)  (0.470)  
Sample Size 131  109   132  110  
[W3] Village Neighbours Model          
Spatial Model      Cross  Cross  
Endogenous Social Effect ()          
          
Round 1, Message D      7.144 * 10.262 * 
      (0.058)  (0.082)  
Round 1, Free-Riding Index (FRI)      0.298 ** -0.005  
      (0.020)  (0.977)  
Round 1, Message D x FRI      0.338 † -0.133  
      (0.136)  (0.677)  
Sample Size      129  110  
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, 
respectively.
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Fig. 1. Map of the Survey Site in Bohol, Showing the Location of Sample Farmers’ Residences 
 
 
40 
 
Fig. 2. Map of the Survey Site in Bohol, Showing the Location of Sample Farmers’ Plots 
 
  
41 
 
Appendix A. Experiment instructions, with remarks in square brackets. 
 
[The following instructions were read to the participants in Cebuano, the local language in the 
study site, with a visual presentation on the screen.] 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Thank you all for taking the time to come today. Today’s workshop may take a whole day, so if 
you think you will not be able to stay that long, let us know now. Before we begin I want to 
make some general comments about what we are doing here today and explain the rules that we 
must follow. We will be playing games with money. Whatever money you win will be yours to 
take home. The amount you will get paid depends on the decisions you and everyone else make 
during the games. After the completion of all games, we will choose one game randomly and 
money you win in this chosen game will be yours to take home. Expected money you can get in 
each game is more or less same. So, we would like you to take the game seriously. You should 
understand that this is not my own money. It is money given to me by Japan International 
Cooperation Agency. There are many researchers in different countries in North America, South 
America, Asia, and Africa playing these same games. Before we proceed any further, let me 
stress something that is very important. Many of you were invited here without understanding 
very much about what we are planning to do today. If at any time you find that this is something 
that you do not wish to participate in for any reason, you are of course free to leave even after we 
already started the game.  
 
We will have six games and one interview session here today. If you have heard anything about 
any other games, you should try to forget about that. These games are completely different. It is 
important that you listen as carefully as possible, because only people who understand the games 
will actually be able to play. We will run through some examples here while we are all together. 
We would like you to take the game seriously and we would like to ask you not to talk to other 
participants during the entire event. This is very important. Please be sure that you follow this 
rule, because it is possible for one person to spoil the game for everyone.  
 
You have already gotten Philippine Pesos (P, hereafter) 50 as a show up fee.
31
 So if you follow 
the rules we will give each one of you the rest of the show up fee, P100, at the end of all 
experiments. Then the total show up fee is P 150. However, if during the game you talk to other 
participants or do not follow the rules in any other way, we will not pay P 100 at the end. Do not 
worry if you do not completely understand the game as we go through the examples here in the 
group. Each of you will have a chance to ask questions to be sure that you understand how to 
play.  
 
Any decisions you make in the exercises or any responses you give us during the interview will 
be strictly confidential. We will never tell anyone your responses or decisions. To assure your 
responses are confidential, we ask you not to speak to each other until the entire experiment is 
completed. 
 
                                                 
31
 One US dollar is equivalent to about P 40 as of August 2012.  
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[Of six games we conducted, we explain herewith three that we have used in this paper. The 
instruction of the other games is available upon request to the authors. ] 
 
2. Dictator Game 
 
This game is played by a pair of individuals. Each of all participants will be paired with one of 
the other participants who are sitting in the other room. But nobody is informed of exactly who 
your partner is either during or after the experiment. Only we know who is to play with whom 
and we will never tell anyone else. Your decisions in this game will be confidential; none of the 
other participants will ever know the decisions you make. At the beginning of the game we will 
provide you with two envelopes. One envelope contains your ID number, three photos with their 
names which are bundled, two answer sheets, one P 50 bill, two P 20 bills, and two P 5 coins. 
 
[We used a strategy method to obtain answers in different cases. In this game, eight cases were 
used. Five cases (which will be explained later) were fixed for all participants and shown on the 
first answer sheet. For the rest, we assigned three different partners (the photos in the envelope) 
to each participant. The partners were chosen from the game participants in the other room. The 
second answer sheet had the spaces to fill the names of assigned partners.] 
 
I would like you to write down your name in the top right name space and copy your ID number 
which is given with the envelope to the top right ID space. Then, copy the name specified on the 
first photo to the first row on the second answer sheet, the name on the second photo in the 
second row and the name on the third photo in the third row. Don’t change the order of photos. 
Please keep your ID number and three photos during the day. We will use them later again. 
 
You have a partner in the other room. Only you receive P 100 but your partner does not. You 
will then have an opportunity to give a portion of your P 100 to your partner. Choose one of the 
eleven possible divisions of the P 100 between you and your partner. You can give P 100, P 90, 
P 80, P 70, P 60, P 50, P 40, P 30, P 20, P 10, or can choose to give nothing. The amount you 
keep is your final payoff and the transferred amount is your partner’s final payoff. Please 
consider how much money you want to send to your partner.  
 
Let’s see a few examples. Your partner is sitting in the other room and only you are given P100. 
Imagine that you decide to give P 50, a half of your initial endowment, to your partner. You are 
left with P 50. At the end of game you will have P 50 and your partner will have P50. You have 
several choices. If you keep all of P 100 like person B [example of person B on the screen, the 
same applies in the following description.], at the end of game you will have P 100 and your 
partner will have nothing. Contrary, if you send everything like person C, this time, at the end of 
game you will have P 0 and your partner will have all of P100. Note that the amount you keep is 
your payoff of this game. The amount your partner receives from you is the payoff of your 
partner. These are only examples. Each of you will decide, on your own, how to allocate the P 
100 between you and your partner. It is important that you understand how the game runs. 
 
[Exercises were conducted to ensure that participants understood the rules of the game.] 
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We will now explain how to fill the answer sheets. Your potential partner is someone listed on 
one of the answer sheets which was distributed with the envelope; (1) someone in your Purok, 
(2) someone in your Barangay, (3) someone in your TSA member in your Barangay, (4) 
someone in your TSA member in a different Barangay, (5) someone in your Municipal.
32
 [The 
order of the cases was randomly shown on the answer sheet to avoid the order effect (i.e., the 
tendency which might arise when the cases change according to some rule.) Since TSAs (water 
users associations) exist only in irrigated area, these cases were asked only for the participants 
from irrigated area.] In addition, in three cases of transaction, we specify the name of your 
partners which were listed on the other answer sheet. In this case, you know who your partner is, 
but your partner will never know from whom the money comes. It is confidential.  
 
First, you consider how much money you want to send to your potential partner on the list 
respectively, and then check the box in the answer sheets. For example, if you would like to send 
P 40 to the partner in the first row, please check the box of P 40 in that row. Continue this 
exercise for each partner. You should consider each case one by one. Do not talk to the other 
people during your decision making. To protect the privacy of your decisions, please insert your 
answer sheets into the envelope we provided to you.   
 
Are there any questions about how the game will proceed? Please fill the answer sheets. Put the 
filled answer sheets back to the envelope. But retain 3 photos of your partners and ID card with 
you. We will use them again. 
 
3. Public Goods Game 
 
[We conducted three rounds of this game. In this paper, we use the results of the last two rounds 
only (i.e., public goods  game with punishment).] 
 
This game is similar to a project by a group of people. To understand this game, think about how 
you allocate your time. You spend part of your time doing things that benefit you or your family 
only. You spend another part of your time doing things that help everyone in your community 
including yourself. Specifically, you might spend part of your time hauling or purifying water for 
your family and you may spend part of your time cleaning or maintaining the community water 
supply which benefits everyone including you. Another example is that you spend part of your 
time working for pay or fixing your house. This activity only benefits your family. However, you 
might spend part of the time cleaning up the neighbourhood which benefits everyone. This game 
is meant to be similar to this sort of situation where you must decide between doing something 
that benefits you only or something that benefits everyone in a group.  
 
At the beginning of the game we will provide you with an envelope. It contains an answer sheet, 
one P 50 bill, two P 20 bills, and two P 5 coins. I would like you to write down your name in the 
top right name space and copy your ID number which is given with the envelope to the top right 
ID space.  
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 Purok is an informal sub-unit of a village. Barangay corresponds to the concept of village. 
TSA indicates water users association.  
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[We used a strategy method for this game, specifying four fixed cases (which will be explained 
later). The three individual partners in the photos were no longer used. Therefore, the 
instructions on how to fill the assigned partners’ names were no longer given.] 
 
As the previous game [the previous game refers to a kind of game played by a group of four 
people], we set up a group of people you play with. There are three other people in your group. 
All of them are sitting in the other room. Each person in the group will then decide how much to 
allocate to a group project and how much to keep for himself or herself. Everyone in the group 
benefits equally from the money allocated to the group project. After all group members have 
decided how much out of P 100 to allocate to the group project, we will add up all the money by 
group. When we know the total, we will double it. You will not know how much any specific 
person in your group allocated to the group project. Each person will then receive an equal share 
of the doubled amount regardless of how much money he or she contributed to the group project. 
 
Let’s see five examples. [First example] Each person decides how much to allocate to the group 
project privately, so you will not know what anyone else has decided when you make your 
choice. Imagine that everyone in your group, including you, allocate P 50 to the group project. In 
total there is P 200. We will double this amount which makes the total P 400. Each of you then 
receives an equal share of the P 400. We would give you each P 100. At the end of game you 
will have P 100 from the group project and P 50 that you kept. You will get a total of P 150. 
[Second example] To continue the example, imagine that this time everybody allocate all money 
to the group project. In total there are P 100+P 100+P 100+P 100=P 400 in the group project. We 
double this amount which makes the total P 800. Each person receives an equal share of the P 
800. At the end of game you will have P 200 from the group project. As you kept nothing, you 
will get P 200+P 0= P 200. The rest of the group will also receive P 200 from the group project. 
[Third example] Let’s continue the example. Now say that all of you allocate nothing to the 
group project. The group project will have a total of P 0+P 0+P 0+P 0=P 0. We have nothing to 
double. Then the game is over. Each person receives nothing from the group project. At the end 
of game, you have P 100 which is kept for yourself. Other group members also have P100. 
[Fourth example] To continue the example, imagine that this time you allocate no money to the 
group project. Imagine that the three other people in your group allocate P50 to the group project. 
In total there are P 0+P 50+P 50+P 50=P 150 in the group project. We double this amount which 
makes the total P 300. Each person receives an equal share of the P 300. You can also get an 
equal share even though your contribution is zero. So, at the end of game you will have P 75 
from the group project and P 100 that you kept. You will get P 75+P 100= P 175. The rest of the 
group will also receive P 75 from the group project. In total, each of the three other group 
members will get P 75+P 50=P 125. They receive P 75 from the group project and have P 50 that 
they kept. [Fifth example] Let’s continue the example for one more. Now say that you allocate 
everything to the group project and keep nothing. Say that the other group members allocate 
nothing to the group project. The group project will have a total of P 100. We double this amount 
which makes the total P 200. Each person receives an equal share of P 200. Each person receives 
P 50 from the group project. At the end of game, you receive P 50 from the group project. The 
other group members who kept all P 100 get P 50 from the group project, even though their 
contribution is zero. In total they receive P 150. These are only examples. Each of you will 
decide, on your own, how to allocate the P 100. It is important that you understand how the game 
runs.  
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[Exercises were conducted to ensure that participants understood the rules of the game.]  
 
We now explain how to fill the answer sheet. You make decisions at different levels of groups: 
(1) 4 Purok members, (2) 4 Barangay members, (3) 4 TSA members, (4) 4 people in the same 
Municipal. [The order of the cases was randomly shown on the answer sheet to avoid the order 
effect. Since TSAs exist only in irrigated area, the third case was asked only for the participants 
from irrigated area.] Please consider how much money you want to contribute to your potential 
group on the list one by one, and then check the box. You can invest P 100, P 90, P 80, P 70, P 
60, P 50, P 40, P 30, P 20, P 10, or can choose to invest nothing. 
 
[After a question and answer session, we asked participants to fill out the answer sheet.] 
 
We will continue this game. The rule of the game is the same as the previous round until making 
contribution. However, after making contribution, by paying P 1 of cost, you can secretly see the 
contribution from each partner. Then, you can send a message to particular partners to indicate 
that you are unhappy with that person’s contribution. To do so, you have to pay P 1 per message. 
This game will be played with the same members twice. 
 
[After providing participants with an envelope containing an answer sheet and money, we gave 
them instructions on how to fill in their names and ID numbers on the answer sheet.] 
 
Here are a few examples. [First example] After we calculate your return, each person will meet 
with us individually outside of the room. In this meeting, we will show you the total contribution 
to the group project and the total return to the group. In this example, the total contribution is P 
140 and the total return is P 280. This amount is equally shared with the members. So, your 
return is P 70. Adding the amount you kept at hand initially (P 50), your total payoff is P 120. In 
this meeting, if you pay P 1 we reveal you the contribution of each member. In this example you 
will know that one person contributed P80, another did so P 10, and the last did not contribute at 
all. Note however, that group members are indicated as A, B, and C, and thus you cannot identify 
who they are.  
 
You may continue the game as follows. If you are unhappy with the contribution of someone, 
you can pay, from your payoff for the round, P 1 per message to send a message of disapproval. 
[We used an ‘unhappy face’ icon card as a message and explained on the screen that it was the 
message they could send.] That is, if you want to send a message to one person that you are 
unhappy with his/her contribution, you have to pay P 1; to send messages to two people, P 2; for 
three, P 3. In this example, you pay P 1 to reveal the contribution and P 2 to send two messages. 
So, your final payoff is P 120-P 1-P 2=P 117. 
 
In order to send a message to someone, simply indicate the person(s) when you are shown the 
card with everyone’s contributions and incomes. There is no need to write a message or deliver a 
message yourself—we will perform these tasks—and you can only send a message if you chose 
to pay to see the contributions of the others. If a player receives a message, he/she may increase 
his/her contribution in the next round of the game. However, it is also possible that he/she does 
not change the contribution level even if he/she receives a message. 
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At the beginning of the following round, we will give you a new envelope. Inside the envelope, 
you may find disapproval messages that have been sent to you. Note that you cannot know which 
member of your group sent the message. In this example, you receive 2 messages, meaning that 
two members of your group were unhappy about your contribution. If there is no card, then no 
one decided to send you a message. Only the sender and the receiver will know that there was a 
message, and there is no obligation to change your decision if you receive a message.  
 
[Second example] In this example, after making your contribution (P 50), you will know that the 
total contribution is P 140, the total return is P 280, and your return is P 70. In the meeting, we 
ask you if you want to see the other member’s contribution. If you decide not to see a card, then 
the round ends up and we move to decision making for the next round. In this case, you don’t 
have an opportunity to send a message of disapproval. Your final income for this round is P 120. 
 
[Third example] Next example, you are informed that the total contribution is P 330, the total 
return is P660, and your return is P 165. If you decide to see a card by paying P 1 , you will find 
that Player A contributed P 80, Player B P 90, Player C P 80, and you P 80. If you decide not to 
send a message of disapproval to anyone, then the round ends up, and we move to decision 
making for the next round. At the end of game you will have P 165 from the group project and P 
20 that you kept. You paid P 1 for seeing a card, so you will get a total of P 184. 
 
[Fourth example] You are informed that the total contribution is P 160, the total return is P 320, 
and your return is P 80. If you decide to see a card by paying P 1, you will find that Player A 
contributed P 80, Player B P 10, Player C P 0, and you P 70. If you wish to send messages of 
disapproval to Player B and Player C, then it costs you P 1+P 1=P 2. At the end of game you will 
have P 80 from the group project and P 30 that you kept. You paid P 1 for seeing a card and P 2 
for sending two messages, so you will get a total of P 107. The messages will be included in the 
envelope of each player in the next round. The player who receives them will not know who sent 
the message.  
 
We explain how to fill the answer sheet. In this game, you have to answer for only one case; 
your three group members are from your Barangay. This is the example of answer sheet. [An 
answer sheet with only one case was shown.]  
 
[After a question and answer session, we asked participants to fill out the answer sheet.] 
 
Now we will ask whether you want to monitor each member’s contribution and send messages to 
them one by one.  
 
[We invited each participant over and asked him/her if he/she wanted to monitor and send an 
unhappy message. ] 
 
Now we proceed to the next round.  
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[After providing participants with an envelope containing an answer sheet and money, we gave 
them instructions on how to fill in their names and ID numbers on the answer sheet. This time, 
message(s) may be included in the envelope.] 
 
Your envelope may contain disapproval messages that have been sent to you. Note that you 
cannot know which member of your group sent the messages. Now, again decide how much you 
contribute to the group project. 
 
[We asked participants to fill out the answer sheet.] 
 
4. Risk Game 
 
This game is played by one person alone. Decision by others has nothing to do with your final 
payment. You will receive P 100. Then you will have an opportunity to bet out of this money. 
Your winnings depend on the card you select. After your decision making, you will pick a card 
from six. Each card has the number from one to six. If you picked card one you will lose the 
money you bet. If you picked card two, you will lose half of the money you bet. If you picked 
card three, you will recoup your bet, thus you will neither lose nor win money. If you picked 
card four, you will receive 1.5 times your bet. If you picked card five, you will double your bet, 
and if you picked card six, you will win 2.5 times your bet. Thus, card number one and two are 
bad, three is neither good nor bad, and four, five, and six are good.  
 
[After providing participants with an envelope containing an answer sheet and money, we gave 
them instructions on how to fill in their names and ID numbers on the answer sheet.] 
 
Here are two examples. [First example] Imagine that you bet P 20. You are left with P 80. You 
pick one of six cards. It is card five. This means that you double your bet. You bet P 20, and two 
times P 20 is P 40. Thus you have the P 80 plus the P 40, resulting in your total earnings of P 120. 
[Second example] Imagine that you bet nothing. You are left with all P 100. There is no need for 
you to pick the card. Your earning is P100.  
 
[Exercises were conducted to ensure that participants understood the rules of the game.]  
 
We explain how to fill the answer sheet. You can bet P 100, P 90, P 80, P 70, P 60, P 50, P 40, P 
30, P 20, P 10, or can choose not to bet.  
 
[After a question and answer session, we asked participants to fill out the answer sheet.] 
 
 
Original Cebuano version 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Salamat sa inyong pag gahin ug panahon karong adlawa. Ang mga actibidades nato karon 
gipaagi nato ug mga dula ug mahuman hangtod sa hapon, kon aduna kaninyo nga dili 
makalampos sa pagtambong palihug lang ug pahibalo kanamo. Sa dili pa kita magsugod, ako una 
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nga ibasabot kaninyo ang atong pagahimu-on ug ang mga reglamento nga atong paga sundon. 
Ang atong pahahimu-on karon gipaagi ug mga dula, ug ang matag dula adunay katumpas nga 
kwarta. Kon pila ang imong madaug maoy imong mdala pag-uli sa inyo. Ang kantidad nga 
imong madalanagadepende sa imong desesyon ug sa desesyon sa mga tawo nga apil niini. 
Pagkahuman sa tanang mga dula magpili ug usa ka dula pinaagi sa random diin kon pila ang 
imong madaug sa maong dula mao usab ang kantidad nga imong madala sa pag-uli. Kasagaran 
ang kantidad nga madaug sa matag dula magka parehas ra usab. Busa among gipanghinaot nga 
inyong seryosohon ang atong mga dula. Atong hinumduman nga dili kini akong kaugalingong 
kwarta. Kining maong kwarta nagaguikan sa Japn International Cooperation agency (JICA). 
Daghan usab ang mga researchers sa ubang nasud sa america asia ug africa nga misagup niining 
maong klase sa mga dula. Sa dili pa kita mupadayon, nahibalo kami nga daghan kaninyo nga gui 
imbetar nga wa kaayo masabte kon unsa ang among pagabuhaton karon. Kon pananglitan inyong 
makita nga dili ka muangay nga moapil sa unsa nga rason, pwede ka nga mouli bisan ug 
nagsugod na ang dula. 
 
Adunay unom ka mga dula ug interview sesyon nga atong pagahimuon karon. Kon adunay laing 
dula nga inyong nadungog, kalimti sa ninyo. Lahi kini nga klase nga mga dula. Importante ang 
inyong pagsabot niining maong dula. Adunay mga examle nga atong ipakita para dugang 
masabtan ang pamaagi sa dula. Among panghinaut nga inyong seryosohon kining maong dula ug 
dili mo mag estoryahanay sa panahon sa dula. Ug among guihangyo nga inyong sundon ang mga 
reglamento tungod kay pwede maguba ang resulta sa maong dula bisan sa usa lamang nga dili 
mosunod. 
 
Amo na kamong guihatagan ug P50 isip bayad sa pagtambong, kon mosunod mo sa patakaran, 
among ihatag ang P50. Ug lain nga P100 pagkahuman sa atong aktibidad karong adlawa. Sa 
katibuk-an adunay kamoy P150. Apan sa panahon sa dula kon dili ka mosunod sa patakaran, dili 
namo ihatag pagdayon ang P100. Ayaw kabalaka kon wala pa kayo nimo hisabti ang pama-agi sa 
dula aduna kitay mga ehimplo aron masabtan pag-ayo ang atong dula. Ang matag-usa adunay 
kahigayunan sa pagpangutana masabtan kon unsaon pagdula. 
 
Ang inyong tubag sa atong mga dula ug mga pangutana sa interview dili mahibaluan sa uban 
(confidential). Para pagsiguro nga dili mahibaluan sa uban, amo kamong guihangyo sa dili 
pagpakigsulti sa inyong mga kauban hangtud mahuman ang atong aktibidad. 
 
[Sa onum ka dula nga gihimo, among gipasabot ang tulo nga among gigamit niining maong 
papel. Ang mga pagtudlo sa uban pang mga dula anaa ra pwede mahatag kon mangayo gikan sa 
tagsulat.] 
 
2. Dictator Game 
 
Kining maong dula himu-on sa pares-pares. Ang matag usa sa tanang participants guipares sa usa 
sa mga participants sa pikas kwarto. Apan walay usa kaninyo ang nahibalo kon kinsa ang iyang 
kapares sa panahon sa experiment o bisan sa pagkahuman na niini. Kami lamang ang nahibalo ug 
dili usab kamo namo pahibalo-on kon si kinsa ang kapares. Ang inyong desisyon o tubag sa 
maong dula dili mahibalo.an ni bisan kinsa sa mga participants (confedintia). Sa pagsugod sa 
dula, amok among hatagan ug duha ka subre. Sa usa ka subre anaaang imong numero sa ID tulo 
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ka letrato u gang ilang pangalan, duha ka papel sulatan sa tubag, usa ka P50 bill, duha ka P20 
bills, ug duha ka P5 nga coin. 
 
[Among gigamit ang strategy method aron pagkab-ot ug mga tubag sa managlahi nga sitwasyon. 
Niining maong dula, walo ka sitasyon ang gigamit. Lima ka sitwasyon (nga ipasabot sa unahan) 
pareho sa tanang magdudula nga makita sa unang answer sheet. Ug sa uban sitwasyon, aduna 
kami gihan-ay nga tulo ka kapares (ang mga hulagway anaa sulod sa subre) sa matag magdudula. 
Ang mga kapares gipili gikan sa mga magdudula sa pikas nga kwarto. Ang ikaduhang answer 
sheet adunay luna sulatan sa pangalan sa nakahan-ay nga kapares.] 
 
Palihug ug sulat sa inyong pangalan sa ibabaw ug tuong bahin sa papel ug isulat usab sa papel 
ang inyong numero sa ID nga anaa sa sulod sa subre ibabaw sa inyong ngalan. Isulat usab ang 
pangalan nga anaa sa unang litrato diha sa unang linya sa (answer sheet) and ikaduhang litrato sa 
ikaduhang linya u gang ikatulong litrato sa ikatulo nga linya. Ayaw usba ang han-ay sa mga 
litrato. Palihug pod ug kupot ug pag amping sa imong ID ug sa tulo ka mga litrato sa tibu-ok 
adlaw kay ato nang gamiton sa uban pang mga actividades. 
 
Aduna kay kapares sa pikas kwarto. Ikaw raang adunay P100 ang imong pares wala. Ikaw 
adunay kahigayunan paghatag tipik sa imong P100 ngadto sa imong pares. Magpili ka kon pila 
ang imong ihatagsa napo’g usa ka kapili-an sa P100 diha kanimo ug sa imong pares. Pwede ka 
nga mohatag ug P100, P90, P80, P70, P60, P50, P40, P30, P20,P10, ug pwede pod nga dili ka 
mohatag ngadto sa imong pares (P0). Kon pila ang imong ibilin mao silbi ang imong daug, u 
gang imong gihatag ngadto sa imong pares mao usab kana ang kantidad isip iyang daug. Busa 
imong hunahunaon kon pila ang angay nimo nga ihatag ngadto sa imong pares. 
 
Atong tan awon ang pipila ka mga ehimplo kon unsa on. Ang imong pares anaa sa pikas kwarto 
ug ikaw lamang ang gihatagan ug P100. Pananglitan mihatag ka ug P50 katunga sa imong kwarta 
ngadto sa imong pares. Ang mahibilin diha kanimo P50 usab. P agkahuman sa dula aduna kay 
nadaug nga P50 ug ang imong pares aduna usab nadaug nga P50. Daghan ka ug kapili.an pila 
ang imong ihatag, pero kon gusto nimo nga dili mohatag sama sa tawo B [ihemplo sa tawoB nga 
anaa sa screen susama usab ang mahitabo], sa pagkahuman sa dula ang imong daug P100 ug ang 
imong pares wala. Pero, kon imo nga ihatag tanansama sa tawo C, sa maong hitabo, sa 
pagkahuman sa dula ang imong pares adunay P100 ug ikaw maoy wala. Himundumi nga kon 
pila ang iyong gibilin mao ang kantidad nga imong daug. Ang kantidad nga imong gihatag 
ngadto sa imong pares mao usab ang daug sa imong pares. Mga ehimplo lamang kini. Ang matag 
usa kaninyo mo diseder sa inyong kaugalingon kon pila ang inyong ibilin diha kaninyo ug pila 
usab ang inyong ihatag ngadto sa imong pares. Importante nga masabtan kon unsa-on pagdula. 
 
[Mga pagbansay gihimo aron pagsiguro nga nasabtan ang pamaagi sa dula.] 
 
Among ipasabot kaninyo unsa.on pagsulat sa tubag diha sa answer sheet. Ang imong posibling 
kapares usa sa mga nalista diha sa answer sheet nga gihatag diha sulod sa subri; (1) kauban sa 
inyong purok, (2) kauban sa inyong barangay, (3) kauban sa inyong TSA sa inyong barangay, (4) 
kauban sa inyong TSA sa managlahi nga barangay, (5) kauban tagilungsod. [Ang han-ay sa 
pagapili-an gihan-ay sa random aron malikayan ang epekto sa han-ay (i.e., ang kinaiya nga 
posibling motumaw kon ang pag-usab sa han-ay adunay gisunod). Tungod kay ang TSAs 
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(kahugpungan sa agagamit ug tubig irigasyon) anaa lamang sa lugar nga may irigasyon, kining 
maong sitwasyon gipangutana lamang sa mga participantes nga sakop sa irigasyon.] Dugang pa 
niini, sa tulo ka mga sitwasyon, among gitino ang mga pangalan sa imong mga kapares nga 
nahisulat sa laing answer sheet. Sa maong sitwasyon, ikaw nahibalo sa imong pares apan ang 
imong pares dili makahibalo kon diin gikan ang daug niya nga kwarta. Kini lilong sa mga 
participantes. 
 
Una, imong hunahuna-on kon pila ang kantidad nga imong ihatag ngadto sa imong posibling 
pares nga ana a sa listahan, tsikan ang kahon sa answer sheets. Panaglitan, kon gusto nimo nga 
mohatag ug P40 ngadto sa imong pares sa unang linya, tsikan ang kahon sa P40 sa maong linya. 
Ipadayon ang pagtubag sa uban pang posibling pares. Imong hunahuna-on ang matag usa ka 
sitwasyon. Ayaw pakigsulti sa imong kaubang participantes sa panahon a imong pagtubag. Aron 
pagproteher sa kaugalingnan sa imong hukom, palihug ug sulod sa imong tubag diha sa subre 
nga among gihatag kaninyo. 
 
Aduna bay mga pangutana kabahin sa pagpadagan sa dula? Palihug ug tubag sa answer sheets. 
Pagkahuman pagtubag, isulod ang answer sheet balik sa subre. Ibilin ang tulo ka hulagway sa 
imong pares ang imong ID diha kanimo. Ato pa kanang gamiton sa uban pang mga dula. 
 
3. Public Goods Game 
 
[Naghimo kami ug tulo ka hugna niining maong dula. Niining maong papel, among gigamit ang 
resulta sa ulahing duha ka hugna (i.e., public goods game nga adunay silot).] 
 
Kining maong dula susama sa proyekto nga gihimo sa grupo sa mga tawo. Aron pagsabot niining 
maong dula, hunahuna-a kon unsa-on nimo pagbahin ang imong oras o panahon. Aduna kay oras 
nga gigahin alang lamang sa kaayuhan sa imong pamilya. Ug aduna usab ikaw panahon nga 
gigahin alang sa kaayuhan sa katilingban lakip ang imong kaugalingon. Sama sa tubig nga atong 
gamiton sa atong panimalay, naggahin kita ug oras sa paghakot ug tubig para sa atong 
kaugalingon ug naggahin usab kita ug oras sa pagpanglimpyo ug magmentinar sa atong tinubdan 
sa tubig diin nakatabang sa katilingban apil na kanato. Lain usab nga pananglitan mao nga ikaw 
naggahin ug panahon nga nagpasuhol sa ubang tawo o kaha nagtrabaho sa imong kaugalingon. 
Kining maong kalihukan nakatabang lamang sa imong kaulingon. Apan naggahin ka usab ug 
oras sa pagpanglmpyo sa imong palibot nga dili lamang nakaayo kanimo kon di lakip na ang 
imong kasilinganan. Kining maong dula susama niining maong sitwasyon diin ikaw mohukom sa 
pagbuhat sa mga butang nga makaayo lamang kanimo o sa pagbuhat sa mga butang nga 
makaayo kanimo ug sa inyong katilingban. 
 
Sa pagsugod sa dulaadunay ihatag kaninyo nga subre. Kini adunay sulod nga usa ka P50, duha 
ka P20 ug duha ka P5. Isulat ang inyong ngalan sa ibaw ug tuong bahin copyaha ang numero sa 
ID nga gihatag uban sa subre a ibabaw ug tuong bahin sa luna nga gigahin. 
 
[Among gigamit ang strategy method niini nga dula ug gipili ang upat ka sitwasyon (nga 
ipasabot sa unahan). Tulo ka mga kapares wala na gamita. Busa wala na ipasabot kon unsa-on 
pagsulat ang tulo ka pares.] 
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Sama sa miaging dula [ang miaging dula nga gipasabot mao ang dula nga gihimo sa grupo sa 
tag-upat ka tawo], aduna kami guihan-ay nga mga tawo isip imong kauban sa dula. Adunay 3 ka 
tawo nga imong kauban sa grupo. Silang tanan atua sa pikas kwarto. Ang matag-usa mohukom 
kon pila ang iyang i-amot sa proyekto sa grupo ug pila ang iyan igahin sa iyang kaugalingon. 
Ang matag-usa makakuha ug patas nga kaayuhan sa kantidad nga gi-amot alang sa proyekto. 
Human ang mga miembro migahin ug tipik sa P100 alang sa proyekto, among tapu-on ang 
tanang kwarta nga inamot. Pagkahuman ug sumada, doblihon ang maong kantidad. Dili ka 
makahibalo kon pila ang kantidad nga nga gigahin sa matag-usa sa imong mga kauban. Ang 
matag-usa makadawat sa parehas nga bahin sa naboble nga kantidadbisan ug gamay o dako ang 
iyang gi-amot. 
 
Aduna kiyay imu-on nga lima ka mga pananglitan. [Unang pananglitan] Ang matag-usa 
mohukom sa hilom kon pila ang iyang i-amot aron dili mahibalo-an sa uban kon pila ang iyang 
gi-amot sa proekto ug ikaw usab dili makahibalo sa gi-amot sa uban. Kon ang tanan apil na ikaw 
mi-amot ug tag P50 alang sa proyekto. Ang katibuk-ang kwartasa pundok mikabat ug P200. 
Atong doblihon ang maong kantidad mamahimo kining P400. Ang matag-usa kaninyo 
makadawat ug parehas nga bahin sa P400. Adunay tag P100 ang matag-usa kaninyo. 
Pagkahuman sa dula ang inyong katibu-an nga daug P100 gikan sa bahin sa proyekto ugng P50 
nga imong gibilin diha kanimo. Ang tanan nimong kwarta P150. [Ikaduhang ehimplo] sa 
pagpadayon sa atong panaglitan, kon ang tanan mohukom nga mo-amot sa tanan nilang kwarta 
[P100] alang sa proyekto sa grupo. Ang katibu-ang kwarta sa pundok 
(P110+P100+P100+P100)=P400. Atong doblihon ang maong kantidad mamahimo kining P800. 
Ang matag-usa makadawat ug parehas nga bahin sa P800. Pagkahuman sa dula aduna kay P200 
bahin sa proyekto. Ug tungod kay imo man nga gi-amot ang tanan nga kwarta, ang katibuk-ang 
daug P200+P0=P200. Ang tanan nga miembro midaug ug P200. [Ikatulong ehimplo] Lain napod 
nga ehimplo. Kon ang tanan dili mo-amot ang pundok adunay P0+P0+P0+P0=P0. Walay 
madoble nga kantidad,ug nahuman na ang dula. Walay nadawat ang mga miembro gikan sa 
proyekto. Pagkahuman sa dula, ang katibk-ang daug mao ra ang kwarta nga diha kanimo. 
[Ikaupat nga ehimplo] Lain napod nga panaglitan, kon ikaw wala mo-amot alang sa proyekto ug 
imong mga kauban mi-amot ug tag P50 matag-usa. Ang kwarta sa pundok mikabat ug 
P0+P50+P50+P50=P150. Atong doblihon ang maong kantidad mahimo kining P300. Ang matag 
–usa makadawat ug parehas nga bahin gikan sa P300. Ikaw makadawat usab bisan ug wala ka 
mo-amot. Pagkahuman sa dula ikaw adunay P75 gikan sa grupo ug P100 nga diha kanimo. Ang 
imong katibu-ang daug P75+P100=P175. Ang imong mga kauban makadawat usab g P75 gikan 
sa grupo. Ang ilang katibuk-ang daug matag-usa P75+P50=P125. Ang P75 mao ang ilang 
nadawat sa grupo ug ang P50 mao ang gibilin diha kanila. [Ikalimang ehimplo] Lain napod nga 
pananglitan.Kon ikaw mi-amot ug P100 walay gibilin diha kanimo.Ug kon ang imong mga 
kauban wala mo-amot. Ang katibuk-ang kwarta sa grupo P100. Atong doblihon ang maong 
kantidad mahimong P200. Ang matag-usa makawat ug parehas nga bahin gikan sa P200. Ang 
matag-usa makadawat ug P50. Pagkahuman sa dula, ang imong daug P50 gikan sa proyekto. 
Ang imong mga kauban nga wala mi-amot makawat usab ug P50 bisan ug wala sila 
mo-amot.Ang ilan katibuk-ang daug P150. Kini mga pananglitan lamang, ang matag-usa kaninyo 
mohukom kon pila ang inyong i-amot gikan sa P100 nga ana-a kanimo. Ang importante nga 
imong mahibalu-an ang pama-agi sa dula. 
 
[Mga pagbansay gihimo aron pagsiguro nga masabtan ang pama-agi sa dula.] 
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Karon among ipasabot kon unsaon pagsulat sa answer sheet. Ikaw mohukom kon pila ang imong 
i-amot sa managlahi  nga grupo diin ikaw nahisakop: (1) 4 ka miembro sa purok, (2) 4  nga 
miembro sa barangay, (3) 4 nga miembro sa TSA, (4) 4 ka tawo nga nagpuyo sa maong lungsod. 
[Ang han-ya sa sitwasyon gipaagi sa random diha sa answer sheet.aron malikayan ang epekto sa 
(order). Tungod ka yang TSAs anaa lamang sa lugar nga adunay irigasyon, ang maong sitwasyon 
gipangutana lamang sa mga participantes nga sakop sa irigasyon.] Palihug hunahuna-a kon pila 
ang imong i-amot sa imong posibling kagrupo nga anaa sa listahan, chekan ang kahon diin 
nasulat ang kantidad nga imong i-amot. Pwede ka mo-amot ug P100, P90, P80, P70, P60, P50, 
P40, P30, P20, P10, ug pwede usab nga dili ka muhatag. 
 
[Human sa mga pangutana ug tubag, amo nang gibatubag ang mga participantes diha sa answer 
sheet.] 
 
Atong ipadayon ang dula. Ang pamaagi sama lang gihapon sa miaging dula taman sa iyong 
pag-amot. Apan human sa inyong pag-amot, kon kamo mobayad ug P1 ikaw makakita sa tago sa 
kantidad nga gi-amot sa imong mga kauban. Unya, ikaw makapadala ug mensahe sa maong 
kauban nga ikaw wala malipay sa kantidad nga iyang gi-amot. Ang matag mensahe adunay 
bayad nga P1 ug ikaw mobayad matag mensahe.Kining maong dula himu-on sa makaduha sa 
parehas nga meimbro. 
 
[Human gihatag ang subre nga may sulod nga answer sheet ug kwarta, among gipasabot unsa-on 
pagsulat sa ngalan, numero sa ID diha sa answer sheet.] 
 
Ani-ay pipila ka ehimplo. [Unang ehimplo] Human namo makwenta ang abot, ang matag-usa 
kaninyo makigkita kanamo sa gawas sa lawak. Dinhi, among ipakita ang katibuk-ang amot sa 
grupo ug ang abot. Niining maong ehimplo, ang katibuk-ang amot P140 ug ang abot P280. Ang 
maong kantidad bahinon sa parehas sa mga miembro. Ang imong daug P70. Atong idugang ang 
kantidad nga imong gibilin nga (P50), ang katibuk-ang daug P120. Sa maong pagkita kon ikaw 
mobayad ug P1 among ipakita ang amot sa matag-usa nimo ka kauban. Sa ehimplo imong 
nahibalu-an nga ang usa nimo ka kauban mi-amot ug P80, ang usa P10, u gang katapusan wala 
mo-amot. Ang mga miembro ato lamang ginganlan ug A, B, ug C aro dili nimo mahibalu-an kon 
si kinsa siya. 
 
Atong ipadayon ang dula sama niini. Kon ikaw wala malipay sa amot sa iong kauban, mobayad 
ka ug P1 matag mensahe sa walamag-uyon, ang kantidad kuha-on gikan sa imong daug. [Among 
gigamit ang hulagway nga nagmug-ot isip mensahe ug gipasabot nga mao kadto ang mensahe 
nga gipadala.] Kini, kon ikaw gusto nga mupadala ug mensahe sa imong kauban kabahin sa ilang 
gi-amot mobayad ka ug P1; kon duha ang imong padalhan P2; kon tulo P3. Sa atong ehimplo, 
mibayad ka ug P1 aron Makita ang ilang amot ug P2 sa pagpadala ug mensahe. Ang imong 
katibuk-ang daug P120-P1-P2= P117. 
 
Aron makapadala ug mensahe, itudlo lamang ang tawo o mga tawo nga padalhan human nimo 
makita ang kard diin nasulat ang amot ug abot. Dili na kinahanglan nga magsulat ka pa ug 
mensahe kami na ang mahibalo pagpadala ug mensahe ug pwede ka lang makapadala ug 
mensahe kon ikaw mobayad alang sa pagtan-aw sa amot sa imong mga kauban. Kon ang 
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miembro makadawat ug mensahe, adunay posibilidad nga iyang tas-an ang iyang amot sa sunod 
nga dula. Posibli usab nga dili niya usbon ang iyang amot bisan kon nakadawat ug mensahe. 
 
Sa pagsugod sa laing hugna, hatagan kamo namo ug lain nga subre, sulob sa subre, posibli nga 
makakita ka ug mensahe saw ala pag-uyon nga gipadala nganha kanimo. Dili ka mahibalo kon si 
kinsa ang nagpadala kanimo ug mensahe. Sa atong ehimplo aduna kay nadawat nga duha ka 
mensahe, nagpasabot nga duha nimo ka akuban wala makauyon sa imong amot. Kon walay 
nadawat nga kard nagpasabot nga walay nagpadala ug mensahe. Ang nagpadala u gang 
gipadalhan lamang ang nasayod nga adunay mensahe, ug walay obligasyon ang nakadawat sa 
mensahe sa pag-usab sa iyang amot. 
 
[Ikaduhang ehimplo] Niining maong ehimplo, human ka mihatag ug amot (P50), imong 
nahibalu-an nga ang tanang amot mikabat ug P140 ug ang abot P280, u gang imong bahin P70. 
Sa panagtagbo sa gawas ikaw gipangutana kon motan-aw ka bas a amot sa uban. Kon ikaw 
mohukom sa dili pagtan-aw, dinhi nahuman ang dula ug mobalhin na kita sa lain nga hugna. Sa 
maong hitabo ikaw walay kahigayunan sa pagpadala ug mensahe saw ala pag-uyon. Ang imong 
daug P120. 
 
[Ikatulong ehimplo] Ang sunod nga ehimplo, ikaw gipahibalo nga ang katibuk-ang amot P330 ug 
ang abot P660, ug ang imong bahin P165. Kon gusto ka nga motan-aw sat tala-an pinaagi sa 
pagbayad ug P1, imong mahibalu-an nga ang kadula A mi-amot ug P80, kadula B mi-amot ug 
P90 ug kadula C mi-amot ug P80, ug ang imo P80. Kon ikaw mohukom sa dili pagpadala ug 
mensahe saw ala pag-uyon sa imong mga kauban, dinhi nahman ang maong hugna ug 
mopadayon a lain nga hugna. Sa pagkahuman sa dulaikaw nakadawat ug bahin sa proyekto sa 
grupo nga P165 ug P20 nga imong gigahin kanimo. Mibayad ka ug P1 sa pagtan-aw sa tala-an, 
busa ang imong katibuk-ang daug P184. 
 
[Ikaupat nga ehimplo] Ikaw gipahibalo nga ang katibuk-ang amot P160 ug ang abot P320, ug ang 
imong bahin P80. Kon gusto ka nga motan-aw sat tala-an pinaagi sa pagbayad ug P1, imong 
mahibalu-an nga ang kadula A mi-amot ug P80, kadula B mi-amot ug P10 ug kadula C mi-amot 
ug P0, ug ang imo P70. Kon ikaw mohukom sa pagpadala ug mensahe saw ala pag-uyon sa 
kadula B ug C makagasto ka ug P1+P1=P2. Pagkahuamn sa dula ikaw adunay P80 bahin sa 
proyekto sa grupo ug P30 nga gigahin kanimo. Mibayad ka ug P1 sa pagtan-aw sa tala-an ug P2 
sa pagpadala ug duha ka mensahe, busa ang imong daug P107. Ang mga mensahe isukip sa subre 
sa sunod nga dula. Ang magdudfula nga makadawat dili makahibako kon kinsa ang nagpadala ug 
mensahe. 
 
Among gipasabot kon unsaon pagsulat sa answer sheet. Niining maong dulausa ra ka sitwasyon 
ug imong sulatan ug tubag, ang imong kauban sa pundok naa ra sa imong barangay. Mao kini 
ang ehimplo nga answer sheet. [Gipakita ang answer sheet nga adunay usa ka sitwasyon.] 
 
[Human sa mga pangutana ug tubag, amo nang gibatubag ang mga participantes diha sa answer 
sheet.] 
 
Karon amok among pangutan-on kon gusto nimo masayran ang amot sa matag-usa ka miembro 
ug magpadala ug mensahe sa matag-usa. 
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[Among gitawag ang mga participantes ug gipangutana kon gusto ba sila makakita sa amot sa 
ilang kauban ug magpadala ba ug mensahe saw ala pag-uyon.] 
 
Atong ipadayon sa sunod nga hugna. 
 
[Human gihatag ang subre nga may sulod nga answer sheet ug kwarta, among gipasabot unsa-on 
pagsulat sa ngalan, numero sa ID diha sa answer sheet. Niining higayuna posibling adunay 
mensahe o mga mensahe nga apil sa subre.] 
 
Ang imong subre posibli nga adunay sulod nga mensahe saw ala pag-uyon nga gipadala kanimo. 
Hibaw-i nga wala ka masayod kon kinsa sa imong kauban ang nagpadala kanimo. Karon, ikaw 
mohukom kon pila ang imong i-amot sa proyekto sa pundok. 
 
[Among gibatubag ang mga participantes diha sa answer sheet.] 
 
4. Risk Game 
 
Kining maong dula pakadula-on lamang sa usa ka tawo. Ang hukom sa uban dili maka apektar 
kanimo. Aduna kay madawat nga P100. Ikaw adunay kahigayunan nga mo pusta gikan sa maong 
kwarta. Ang imong madaug naga depene sa card nga imong mapili-an. Ikaw mohukom kon asa 
nga card ang imong pili-on gikan sa onum nga kapili-an, ug imong kuha-on ang card nga 
napili-an. Ang mga card adunay numero gikan sa usa hangtod sa unom. Kon ikaw mokuha sa 
unang card, ikaw mapilde sa dula. Kon ang ikaduhang card imong kuha-on mapilde sa ug 
katunga sa imong pusta. Kon imong pili-on ang ikatulong card tabla ra ka, walay daug walay 
pilde. Kon imong pili-on ang ikaupat nga card. Ikaw modaug ug 1.5 sa imong pusta. Kon imong 
pili-on ang ikalima nga card madoble ang imong daug ug kon ang ikaunom nga card ang 
mapili-an ikaw modaug ug 2.5. Sa ato pa, ang card nga adunay numero usa ug duha dili maayo, 
ang numero tulo table ra, u gang numero upat, lima ug unom ang mga maayo. 
 
[Human gihatag ang subre nga may sulod nga answer sheet ug kwarta, among gipasabot unsa-on 
pagsulat sa ngalan, numero sa ID diha sa answer sheet.] 
 
Ani-ay duha ka ehimplo. [Unang ehimplo] Panaglitan mipusta ka ug P20. Adunay nabilin nimo 
nga P80. Mipili ka ug usa sa unom ka card. Ang imong napili-an numero dos. Nga sa ato pa 
madoble ang imong kwarta nga gipusta. Mipusta ka ug P20 2xP20 =P40. Busa ang imong tanan 
nga kwarta human sa dula mao ang P80+P40 aduna kay P120. [Ikaduhang ehimplo] Kon dili ka 
mopusta.Ang naa kanimo P100 gihapon. Dili na kinahanglan nga mopili ka ug caerd kay wala 
man ka mopusta. Ang imong tanan nga kwarta P100 gihapon. 
 
[Mga pagbansay gihimo aron pagsiguro nga masabtan ang pama-agi sa dula.] 
 
Among gipasabot unsaon pagsulat sa answer sheet. Pwede ka mopusta ug P100,P90,P80, P70, 
P60, P50, P40, P30, P20, P10 o dili ka mopusta. 
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[Human sa mga pangutana ug tubag, amo nang gibatubag ang mga participantes diha sa answer 
sheet.] 
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Appendix B. Neighbourhood Characteristics and Regression Results for Robustness Check 
Table B1 Neighbourhood Structure: Characteristics of the 4 Weight Matrices, 6-Nearest Neighbour Model 
  
------- Field Plot Neighbours ------- ------- Residential Neighbours ------- 
  (1) 
Irrigated 
Areas 
(2) 
Rainfed 
Areas 
(3) 
t-test for 
mean 
difference 
(2)-(1) 
[p-value] 
(4) 
Irrigated 
Areas 
(5) 
Rainfed 
Areas 
(6) 
t-test for 
mean 
difference 
(5)-(4) 
[p-value]   
Weight Code (a) (b)  (c) (d)  
Number of Observations 131 109  132 110  
Total Number of Links 786 654  792 660  
Non-zero Weights (%) 4.58 5.51  4.55 5.45  
Average Number of 
Neighbours 
 per Person 
6 6 0 6 6 0 
      
Average Distance between  
 Neighbours (km) 
0.634 0.500 0.134 0.635 0.492 0.143 
(0.316) (0.385) [0.000] (0.357) (0.534) [0.000] 
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Table B2 Neighbourhood Structure: Characteristics of the 4 Weight Matrices, 1/d Distance Decay Neighbourhood Model 
  
------- Field Plot Neighbours ------- ------- Residential Neighbours ------- 
  (1) 
Irrigated 
Areas 
(2) 
Rainfed 
Areas 
(3) 
t-test for 
mean 
difference 
(2)-(1) 
[p-value] 
(4) 
Irrigated 
Areas 
(5) 
Rainfed 
Areas 
(6) 
t-test for 
mean 
difference 
(5)-(4) 
[p-value]   
Weight Code (a) (b)  (c) (d)  
Number of Observations 131 109  132 110  
Total Number of Links n/a n/a  n/a n/a  
Non-zero Weights (%) n/a n/a  n/a n/a  
Average Number of 
Neighbours 
 per Person 
n/a n/a  n/a n/a  
      
Average Distance between  
 Neighbours (km) 
2.532 1.707 0.825 2.460 1.570 0.890 
(0.000) (0.000) [0.000] (0.000) (0.000) [0.000] 
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Table B3 Neighbourhood Structure: Characteristics of the 4 Weight Matrices, Barangay Neighbours Model 
  
------- Field Plot Neighbours ------- -------- Residential Neighbours ------- 
  (1) 
Irrigated 
Areas 
(2) 
Rainfed 
Areas 
(3) 
t-test for 
mean 
difference 
(2)-(1) 
[p-value] 
(4) 
Irrigated 
Areas 
(5) 
Rainfed 
Areas 
(6) 
t-test for 
mean 
difference 
(5)-(4) 
[p-value]   
Weight Code (a) (b)  (c) (d)  
Number of Observations n/a n/a  129 110  
Total Number of Links n/a n/a  1704 2270  
Non-zero Weights (%) n/a n/a  10.24 18.76  
Average Number of Neighbours 
 per Person 
n/a n/a  13.209 20.636 7.427 
   (5.066) (7.284) [1.000] 
Average Distance between  
 Neighbours (km) 
n/a n/a  1.166 0.962 0.143 
   (0.659) (0.515) [0.564] 
Note: Field plot neighbours are not defined in the barangay neighbours model. Two observations are dropped from the irrigated areas because of the absence of 
neighbours withinthe sample farmers. 
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Table B4 Spatial Regressions for the Dictator Game, 6-Nearest Neighbour Model 
Neighbourhood Field Plot   Residential 
                      
Ecosystem Irrigated   Rainfed     Irrigated   Rainfed   
Spatial Model Lag & Cross   Cross     Lag & Cross   Cross   
Weight Code (a)   (b)     (c)   (d)   
Endogenous Social Effect                   
   0.195 †       0.238 †     
   (0.148)         (0.101)       
Neighbours' Characteristics                   
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy -24.226 ***       -17.041 *     
    (0.008)         (0.059)       
  Age 0.180   0.262     -0.034   0.785 † 
    (0.647)   (0.610)     (0.928)   (0.136)   
  Gender Dummy 7.367   -1.202     6.370   9.359   
    (0.400)   (0.927)     (0.476)   (0.440)   
  Years of Schooling 0.329   -2.731     -0.305   1.124   
    (0.854)   (0.156)     (0.881)   (0.518)   
  Ln Asset -0.214   -0.101     -0.441   2.689   
    (0.958)   (0.984)     (0.928)   (0.525)   
  Field Area (ha) 20.885 *** 1.778     18.450 *** 0.789   
    (0.001)   (0.664)     (0.003)   (0.834)   
  Household Size -1.720   -0.295     -0.383   -1.277   
    (0.302)   (0.913)     (0.803)   (0.543)   
  Household Female Ratio -18.869   -37.201     -30.804   -5.128   
    (0.567)   (0.168)     (0.372)   (0.866)   
Own Characteristics                   
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy -2.192         -1.116       
    (0.521)         (0.743)       
  Age -0.161   -0.161     -0.140   -0.070   
    (0.284)   (0.390)     (0.354)   (0.678)   
  Gender Dummy 3.304   6.081 †   2.439   5.955 † 
    (0.412)   (0.132)     (0.544)   (0.109)   
  Years of Schooling 0.872   0.342     0.897   0.569   
    (0.164)   (0.615)     (0.180)   (0.374)   
  Ln Asset -0.560   0.981     -0.802   -0.688   
    (0.719)   (0.621)     (0.627)   (0.713)   
  Field Area (ha) -0.810   1.293     -0.999   2.576 * 
    (0.764)   (0.462)     (0.719)   (0.085)   
  Household Size -0.180   0.126     -0.381   0.429   
    (0.804)   (0.882)     (0.606)   (0.589)   
  Household Female Ratio 27.567 ** -1.961     28.831 ** -4.408   
    (0.020)   (0.854)     (0.014)   (0.661)   
Intercept 16.328   41.595     31.171   -49.609   
    (0.718)   (0.501)     (0.543)   (0.398)   
Sample Size 131   109     132   110   
Fit of the Model                   
  Multiple R-squared     0.135         0.156   
  Adjusted R-squared     0.006         0.032   
  F Statistic     1.049         1.257   
        (0.414)         (0.249)   
  Wald Statistic 2.200 †       3.374 *     
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    (0.138)         (0.066)       
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, 
respectively.  
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Table B5 Spatial Regressions for the Dictator Game, 1/d Distance Decay Neighbourhood Model 
Neighbourhood Field Plot   Residential 
                    
Ecosystem Irrigated   Rainfed     Irrigated   Rainfed   
Spatial Model Lag & Cross   Cross     Lag & Cross   Cross   
Weight Code (a)   (b)     (c)   (d)   
Endogenous Social Effect                   
   0.484         0.487 †     
   (0.151)         (0.150)       
Neighbours' Characteristics                   
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy -48.841 †       -48.751 †     
    (0.100)         (0.101)       
  Age 0.709   1.906     0.682   0.985 † 
    (0.606)   (0.610)     (0.618)   (0.136)   
  Gender Dummy -8.251   -8.900     -7.724   1.236   
    (0.745)   (0.927)     (0.760)   (0.440)   
  Years of Schooling 1.728   -3.513     1.639   -5.190   
    (0.773)   (0.156)     (0.783)   (0.518)   
  Ln Asset -10.724   6.529     -10.468   5.572   
    (0.468)   (0.984)     (0.476)   (0.525)   
  Field Area (ha) 63.798 *** 0.927     63.760 *** 9.260   
    (0.000)   (0.664)     (0.000)   (0.834)   
  Household Size -4.442   2.166     -4.302   2.437   
    (0.384)   (0.913)     (0.396)   (0.543)   
  Household Female Ratio 38.869   -74.952     40.645   -64.961   
    (0.717)   (0.168)     (0.705)   (0.866)   
Own Characteristics                   
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy -0.498         -0.520       
    (0.887)         (0.881)       
  Age -0.150   -0.183     -0.152   -0.156   
    (0.339)   (0.390)     (0.332)   (0.678)   
  Gender Dummy 2.134   4.666 †   2.131   3.910 † 
    (0.613)   (0.132)     (0.606)   (0.109)   
  Years of Schooling 0.690   0.119     0.687   0.094   
    (0.289)   (0.615)     (0.288)   (0.374)   
  Ln Asset -0.940   0.372     -0.923   -0.988   
    (0.569)   (0.621)     (0.574)   (0.713)   
  Field Area (ha) 0.339   1.177    0.312   2.439 * 
    (0.907)   (0.462)     (0.914)   (0.085)   
  Household Size 0.009   -0.283     0.007   0.384   
    (0.991)   (0.882)     (0.993)   (0.589)   
  Household Female Ratio 27.298 ** -4.997     27.161 ** -1.532   
    (0.024)   (0.854)     (0.023)   (0.661)   
Intercept 93.856   -85.387     0.745   -38.028   
    (0.729)   (0.501)     (0.543)   (0.398)   
Sample Size 131   109     132   110   
Fit of the Model                   
  Multiple R-squared     0.157         0.177   
  Adjusted R-squared     0.031         0.056   
  F Statistic     1.246         1.460 † 
        (0.256)         (0.142)   
  Wald Statistic 3.532 *       3.575 *     
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    (0.060)         (0.059)       
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table B6 Spatial Regressions for the Dictator Game, Barangay Neighbours Model 
Neighbourhood Residential 
            
Ecosystem Irrigated   Rainfed   
Weight Code (c)   (d)   
Barangay Neighbours' Characteristics       
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy 0.345       
    (0.991)       
  Age 0.470   1.147   
    (0.399)   (0.502)   
  Gender Dummy -10.871   27.235   
    (0.407)   (0.481)   
  Years of Schooling 4.133   2.083   
    (0.173)   (0.527)   
  Ln Asset -7.361   0.158   
    (0.333)   (0.989)   
  Field Area (ha) 43.010 *** -2.514   
    (0.000)   (0.825)   
  Household Size -4.180 * -1.684   
    (0.054)   (0.794)   
  Household Female Ratio 79.410   -18.361   
    (0.459)   (0.786)   
Own Characteristics         
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy -2.408       
    (0.593)       
  Age -0.223   -0.071   
    (0.173)   (0.707)   
  Gender Dummy 3.055   6.109   
    (0.484)   (0.184)   
  Years of Schooling 1.054   0.336   
    (0.166)   (0.589)   
  Ln Asset -1.294   -1.388   
    (0.487)   (0.475)   
  Field Area (ha) -0.034   2.532 † 
    (0.991)   (0.102)   
  Household Size 0.014   0.690   
    (0.987)   (0.389)   
  Household Female Ratio 31.837 ** -2.205   
    (0.046)   (0.828)   
Intercept 10.377   -37.971   
    (0.913)   (0.699)   
Sample Size 129   110   
Fit of the Model         
  Multiple R-squared 0.239   0.149   
  Adjusted R-squared 0.131   0.024   
  F Statistic 2.201 *** 1.189 *** 
    (0.009)   (0.000)   
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, 
respectively.  
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Table B7 Spatial Regressions for the Public Goods Game, Round 1, 6-Nearest Neighbour Model 
Neighbourhood Field plot   Residential 
                      
Ecosystem Irrigated   Rainfed     Irrigated   Rainfed   
Spatial Model Cross   Cross     Cross   Cross   
Weight Code (a)   (b)     (c)   (d)   
Neighbours' Characteristics                  
  Volumetric Pricing Ddummy -6.866         -14.336 †     
    (0.273)         (0.139)       
  Age 0.098 † 0.639     -0.452   -0.192   
    (0.131)   (0.320)     (0.273)   (0.787)   
  Gender Ddummy -4.975   22.072     -12.263   35.698 ** 
    (0.279)   (0.182)     (0.208)   (0.031)   
  Years of Schooling 2.298   0.367     3.683 † 1.560   
    (0.926)   (0.883)     (0.106)   (0.523)   
  Ln Asset 1.334   -8.768     -2.530   -6.038   
    (0.998)   (0.177)     (0.640)   (0.291)   
  Field Area (ha) 8.316   -8.177 †   11.152 * -0.083   
    (0.190)   (0.112)     (0.089)   (0.987)   
  Household Size -1.062   2.486     2.119   -0.984   
    (0.328)   (0.466)     (0.209)   (0.728)   
  Household female ratio -29.129   -58.276 *   7.321   -27.096   
    (0.751)   (0.086)     (0.847)   (0.509)   
Own Characteristics                   
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy -0.797         0.088       
    (0.955)         (0.981)       
  Age -0.425 *** -0.727 *** -0.429 ** -0.716 *** 
    (0.008)   (0.003)     (0.011)   (0.002)   
  Gender Dummy -5.018   -1.357     -6.305   -1.867   
    (0.305)   (0.787)     (0.154)   (0.709)   
  Years of Schooling 0.086   -0.336     0.400   0.200   
    (0.876)   (0.693)     (0.591)   (0.816)   
  Ln Asset 1.711   2.176     1.284   1.728   
    (0.201)   (0.381)     (0.478)   (0.494)   
  Field Area (ha) 5.090 * -2.027     5.575 * -1.665   
    (0.069)   (0.328)     (0.064)   (0.409)   
  Household Size -0.415   -0.818     -0.970   -1.136   
    (0.367)   (0.442)     (0.234)   (0.292)   
  Household Female Ratio 14.666 † -23.425 *   16.356   -19.155   
    (0.125)   (0.086)     (0.206)   (0.166)   
Control                   
  Risk-Taking Behaviour 0.211 *** 0.102     0.196 ** 0.122   
    (0.006)   (0.277)     (0.015)   (0.175)   
Intercept 22.797   162.720 **   58.596   149.269 * 
    (0.153)   (0.037)     (0.295)   (0.061)   
Sample Size 131   109     132   110   
Fit of the Model                   
  Multiple R-squared 0.230   0.234     0.264   0.216   
  Adjusted R-squared 0.114   0.110     0.154   0.091   
  F Statistic 1.982 ** 1.890 **   2.404 *** 1.729 * 
    (0.018)   (0.034)     (0.003)   (0.058)   
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Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table B8 Spatial Regressions for the Public Goods Game, Round 1 1/d Distance Decay 
Neighbourhood Model 
Neighbourhood Field plot   Residential 
                    
Ecosystem Irrigated   Rainfed     Irrigated   Rainfed   
Spatial Model Cross   Cross     Cross   Cross   
Weight Code (a)   (b)     (c)   (d)   
Neighbours' Characteristics                   
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy -38.147     -39.960    
    (0.241)     (0.221)    
  Age 0.161  1.264   0.284  1.105  
    (0.915)  (0.502)   (0.850)  (0.563)  
  Gender Dummy -6.837  -8.330   -6.930  -5.004  
    (0.806)  (0.833)   (0.803)  (0.900)  
  Years of Schooling 9.733 † -5.062   10.310 † -5.033  
    (0.147)  (0.450)   (0.123)  (0.452)  
  Ln Asset -19.896  -9.437   -21.229  -9.427  
    (0.226)  (0.581)   (0.194)  (0.581)  
  Field Area (ha) 39.055 ** -4.703   39.626 ** -3.527  
    (0.033)  (0.778)   (0.030)  (0.834)  
  Household Size -4.461  14.895 *** -4.645  14.899 *** 
    (0.428)  (0.002)   (0.406)  (0.002)  
  Household Female Ratio -28.228  -14.897   -33.359  -7.854  
    (0.810)  (0.860)   (0.777)  (0.926)  
Own Characteristics          
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy 0.190     -0.047    
    (0.961)     (0.990)    
  Age -0.377 ** -0.745 *** -0.367 ** -0.765 *** 
    (0.031)  (0.002)   (0.035)  (0.002)  
  Gender Dummy -6.057  -5.849   -6.557  -5.797  
    (0.194)  (0.235)   (0.151)  (0.237)  
  Years of Schooling 0.319  -0.350   0.351  -0.433  
    (0.662)  (0.668)   (0.627)  (0.593)  
  Ln Asset 1.341  2.985   1.284  2.461  
    (0.462)  (0.218)   (0.479)  (0.312)  
  Field Area (ha) 5.665 * -2.124   5.748 * -1.888  
    (0.074)  (0.288)   (0.068)  (0.343)  
  Household Size -0.460  -0.757   -0.510  -0.683  
    (0.574)  (0.462)   (0.529)  (0.509)  
  Household Female Ratio 16.828  -15.428   15.309  -15.625  
    (0.207)  (0.234)   (0.246)  (0.229)  
Control          
  Risk-Taking Behaviour 0.235 *** 0.190 **  0.237 *** 0.189 ** 
    (0.004)  (0.035)   (0.004)  (0.032)  
Intercept 202.167  78.102   211.918  84.815  
    (0.208)  (0.684)   (0.186)  (0.659)  
Sample Size 131  109   132  110  
Fit of the Model          
  Multiple R-squared 0.237  0.268   0.240  0.268  
  Adjusted R-squared 0.123  0.150   0.126  0.151  
  F Statistic 2.070 ** 2.272 *** 2.115 ** 2.293 *** 
    (0.013)  (0.009)   (0.011)  (0.008)  
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Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table B9 Spatial Regressions for the Public Goods Ggame, Round 1 Barangay Neighbours 
Model 
Neighbourhood Residential 
          
Ecosystem Irrigated   Rainfed   
Weight Code (c)   (d)   
Barangay Neighbours' Characteristics       
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy 20.498       
    (0.528)       
  Age 0.189   5.050 ** 
    (0.741)   (0.027)   
  Gender Dummy -22.791 * 49.312   
    (0.092)   (0.331)   
  Years of Schooling 1.257   -1.643   
    (0.686)   (0.716)   
  Ln Asset 0.455   -3.908   
    (0.954)   (0.793)   
  Field Area (ha) 17.102 * -32.163 ** 
    (0.083)   (0.033)   
  Household Size -1.945   13.063 † 
    (0.382)   (0.126)   
  Household Female Ratio 100.876   158.959 * 
    (0.365)   (0.076)   
Own Characteristics         
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy 0.841       
    (0.856)       
  Age -0.410 ** -0.457 * 
    (0.016)   (0.071)   
  Gender Dummy -6.080   -2.227   
    (0.176)   (0.713)   
  Years of Schooling 0.531   -0.123   
    (0.507)   (0.880)   
  Ln Asset 1.814   0.715   
    (0.343)   (0.779)   
  Field Area (ha) 5.693 * -2.124   
    (0.065)   (0.295)   
  Household Size -0.704   -0.195   
    (0.410)   (0.853)   
  Household Female Ratio 30.119 * -9.280   
    (0.065)   (0.490)   
Control         
  Risk-Taking Behaviour 0.197 ** 0.088   
    (0.022)   (0.327)   
Intercept -44.801   -266.381 * 
    (0.647)   (0.041)   
Sample Size 129   110   
Fit of the Model         
  Multiple R-squared 0.245   0.250   
  Adjusted R-squared 0.130   0.130   
  F Statistic 2.121 ** 2.083 *** 
    (0.010)   (0.017)   
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Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table B10 Spatial Regressions for the Public Goods Game, Round 2, 6-Nearest Neighbour 
Model 
Neighbourhood Field Plot   Residential 
                    
Ecosystem Irrigated   Rainfed     Irrigated   Rainfed   
Spatial Model 
Lag and 
cross 
  Cross     
Error and 
cross 
  Cross   
Weight Code (a)   (b)     (c)   (d)   
Endogenous Social Effect                   
   0.358 ***               
   (0.001)                 
Correlated social Effect                   
              0.376 ***     
             (0.006)       
Neighbours' Characteristics                   
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy -1.908         -9.155       
    (0.786)         (0.287)       
  Age -0.009   -0.963 *   -0.413   -0.283   
    (0.976)   (0.093)     (0.256)   (0.649)   
  Gender Dummy -2.340   18.017     -0.837   32.203 ** 
    (0.740)   (0.219)     (0.926)   (0.030)   
  Years of Schooling 0.728   0.933     0.716   4.596 ** 
    (0.618)   (0.675)     (0.700)   (0.034)   
  Ln Asset -0.035   1.234     0.558   -4.875   
    (0.992)   (0.830)     (0.902)   (0.326)   
  Field Area (ha) 2.780   -0.524     5.011   1.890   
    (0.572)   (0.909)     (0.409)   (0.667)   
  Household Size 0.731   -1.162     -0.540   1.222   
    (0.593)   (0.702)     (0.739)   (0.624)   
  Household Female Ratio -15.336   30.637     -32.996   -22.686   
    (0.579)   (0.324)     (0.334)   (0.534)   
Own Characteristics                   
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy 2.880         3.327       
    (0.293)         (0.225)       
  Age 0.163   -0.071     0.161   -0.150   
    (0.184)   (0.750)     (0.205)   (0.489)   
  Gender Dummy 1.990   0.091     0.447   1.059   
    (0.534)   (0.983)     (0.890)   (0.807)   
  Years of Schooling 0.321   0.219     0.374   0.263   
    (0.532)   (0.771)     (0.503)   (0.726)   
  Ln Asset 1.128   0.939     1.192   1.346   
    (0.363)   (0.674)     (0.377)   (0.550)   
  Field Area (ha) -0.117   -2.198     0.763   -2.547 † 
    (0.957)   (0.233)     (0.738)   (0.149)   
  Household Size 0.591   0.405     0.446   0.000   
    (0.308)   (0.676)     (0.453)   (1.000)   
  Household Female Ratio 6.422   -3.527     4.597   -16.797   
    (0.499)   (0.778)     (0.634)   (0.178)   
Controls                   
  Risk-Taking Behaviour 0.144 ** 0.288 *** 0.150 *** 0.235 *** 
    (0.014)   (0.001)     (0.010)   (0.003)   
  Round 1, Message D 7.480 ** 10.778 *   8.020 ** 9.978 * 
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    (0.036)   (0.066)     (0.022)   (0.089)   
  Round 1, Free-Riding Index (FRI) 0.229 * 0.040     0.296 ** 0.045   
    (0.065)   (0.835)     (0.013)   (0.807)   
  Round 1, Message D x FRI 0.453 ** -0.253     0.350 * -0.220   
    (0.038)   (0.407)     (0.096)   (0.470)   
  Round 1, Result 0.844 *** 0.561 *** 0.850 *** 0.527 *** 
    (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000)   (0.000)   
Intercept -54.973 † 11.319     -6.535   30.080   
    (0.148)   (0.872)     (0.905)   (0.675)   
Sample Size 131   109     132   110   
Fit of the Model                   
  Multiple R-squared     0.472         0.491   
  Adjusted R-squared     0.360         0.384   
  F Statistic     4.194 ***     4.568 *** 
        (0.000)         (0.000)   
  Wald Statistic 14.558 ***       10.295 ***     
    (0.000)         (0.001)       
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, 
respectively.  
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Table B11 Spatial Regressions for the Public Goods Game, Round 2, 1/d Distance Decay 
Neighbourhood Model 
Neighbourhood Field plot   Residential 
                      
Ecosystem Irrigated   Rainfed     Irrigated   Rainfed   
Spatial Model 
Lag & 
Ccross 
  Cross     
Lag &and 
Cross 
  Cross   
Weight Code (a)   (b)     (c)   (d)   
Endogenous Social Effect                   
   0.510 *       0.514 *     
   (0.097)         (0.095)       
Neighbours' Characteristics                   
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy 22.672         22.174       
    (0.312)         (0.323)       
  Age 0.702   -2.551 *   0.726   -2.370   
    (0.505)   (0.132)     (0.489)   (0.649)   
  Gender Dummy -16.220   23.251     -16.076   16.813 ** 
    (0.399)   (0.502)     (0.400)   (0.030)   
  Years of Schooling -7.617 † 6.710     -7.647 * 7.850 ** 
    (0.100)   (0.276)     (0.097)   (0.034)   
  Ln Asset 30.607 *** 7.667     30.733 *** 8.600   
    (0.007)   (0.610)     (0.007)   (0.326)   
  Field Area (ha) -11.205   8.716     -11.440   8.429   
    (0.386)   (0.575)     (0.374)   (0.667)   
  Household Ssize 1.138   -10.041     1.101   -10.455   
    (0.771)   (0.033)     (0.777)   (0.624)   
  Household Female Rratio -160.619 * 95.522     -164.478 * 99.582   
    (0.061)   (0.203)     (0.055)   (0.534)   
Own Characteristics                   
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy 2.471         2.575       
    (0.355)         (0.330)       
  Age 0.221 * -0.045     0.220 * -0.022   
    (0.071)   (0.838)     (0.069)   (0.489)   
  Gender Dummy 1.781   0.061     1.933   -0.503   
    (0.578)   (0.989)     (0.538)   (0.807)   
  Years of Schooling 0.051   0.591     0.044   0.361   
    (0.918)   (0.417)     (0.930)   (0.726)   
  Ln Asset 1.664   1.401     1.671   1.472   
    (0.184)   (0.518)     (0.180)   (0.550)   
  Field Area (ha) -0.712   -1.665     -0.736   -1.266 † 
    (0.750)   (0.343)     (0.741)   (0.149)   
  Household Size 0.676   0.789     0.694   0.865   
    (0.233)   (0.413)     (0.217)   (1.000)   
  Household fFmale Ratio 2.595   -1.729     2.708   -9.049   
    (0.783)   (0.885)     (0.772)   (0.178)   
Controls                   
  Risk-Taking Behaviour 0.126 ** 0.207 *** 0.128 ** 0.158 *** 
    (0.029)   (0.011)     (0.026)   (0.003)   
  Round 1, Message D 7.370 ** 11.469 *   7.365 ** 12.808 * 
    (0.031)   (0.046)     (0.030)   (0.089)   
  Round 1, Free-Riding Index (FRI) 0.289 ** 0.019     0.291 ** 0.071   
    (0.015)   (0.930)     (0.014)   (0.807)   
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  Round 1, Message D x FRI 0.309 † -0.220     0.305   -0.232   
    (0.150)   (0.477)     (0.154)   (0.470)   
  Round 1, Result 0.872 *** 0.645 *** 0.871 *** 0.707 *** 
    (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000)   (0.000)   
Intercept -298.363 *** -27.162     -298.792 *** -48.547   
    (0.008)   (0.871)     (0.008)   (0.675)   
Sample Size 131   109     132   110   
Fit of the Model                   
  Multiple R-squared     0.501         0.495   
  Adjusted R-squared     0.394         0.388   
  F Statistic     4.695 ***     4.633 *** 
        (0.000)         (0.000)   
  Wald Statistic 4.658 *       4.752 **     
    (0.097)         (0.029)       
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table B12 Spatial Regressions for the Public Goods Game, Round 2, Barangay Neighbours 
Model 
Neighbourhood Residential 
          
Ecosystem Irrigated   Rainfed   
Weight Code (c)   (d)   
Barangay Neighbours' Characteristics       
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy -20.753       
    (0.382)       
  Age 1.131 *** 0.191   
    (0.008)   (0.929)   
  Gender Dummy 12.230   50.382   
    (0.228)   (0.289)   
  Years of Schooling 5.878 ** -5.310   
    (0.012)   (0.205)   
  Ln Asset -10.934 * -4.761   
    (0.068)   (0.729)   
  Field Area (ha) -3.797   6.728   
    (0.605)   (0.633)   
  Household Size 2.459 † 9.855   
    (0.133)   (0.217)   
  Household Female Ratio -399.148 *** 125.597 † 
    (0.000)   (0.136)   
Own Characteristics         
  Volumetric Pricing Dummy 1.165       
    (0.731)       
  Age 0.242 * -0.146   
    (0.057)   (0.544)   
  Gender Dummy 1.938   0.144   
    (0.556)   (0.979)   
  Years of Schooling 0.850   -0.256   
    (0.151)   (0.736)   
  Ln Asset 0.090   1.237   
    (0.949)   (0.603)   
  Field Area (ha) 0.921   -2.981 † 
    (0.691)   (0.115)   
  Household Size 0.931 † 0.880   
    (0.140)   (0.372)   
  Household Female Ratio -31.000 ** -5.502   
    (0.013)   (0.666)   
Controls         
  Risk-Taking Behaviour 0.116 * 0.275 *** 
    (0.073)   (0.001)   
  Round 1, Message D 7.144 * 10.262 * 
    (0.058)   (0.082)   
  
Round 1, Free-Riding Index 
(FRI) 
0.298 ** -0.005   
    (0.020)   (0.977)   
  Round 1, Message D x FRI 0.338 † -0.133   
    (0.136)   (0.677)   
  Round 1, Result 0.893 *** 0.536 *** 
    (0.000)   (0.000)   
75 
 
Intercept 191.664 ** -84.734   
    (0.012)   (0.486)   
Sample Size 132   110   
Fit of the Model         
  Multiple R-squared 0.667   0.452   
  Adjusted R-squared 0.602   0.337   
  F Statistic 10.200 *** 3.911 *** 
    (0.000)   (0.000)   
Note: The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, *, and † indicate 1, 5, 10, and 15% statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
 
